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PSLRA, SLUSA, and
Variable Annuities: Overlooked
Side Effects of a Potent
Legislative Medicine
by Michael J. Borden*
INTRODUCTION
This Article highlights a harmful and far-reaching unintended
consequence of two major pieces of securities litigation reform legisla-
tion1 that were passed as part of the Republican party's Contract with
America in the mid-1990s. These reforms were justified, in part, on the
grounds that they would benefit investors by improving disclosure of
financial information by corporations. However, for many aggrieved
investors, the effect of the legislation was just the opposite. Because of
inadequate and misleading disclosures made by life insurance companies
and their registered representatives, consumers were induced to
purchase inappropriate investments carrying excessive fees that reduced
the value of their retirement nest eggs. Had the purveyors of these
variable annuities adequately disclosed the nature of the product and
fully explained the complicated factors that go into a decision to
purchase a variable annuity, most consumers would not have purchased
* Abraham L. Freedman Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Temple University
School of Law. New York University (J.D., 1998). I thank Rick Greenstein, Melissa
Jacoby, Bill Nelson, and Joel Topcik for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. I thank Lindsey Ermey, Jeffrey Levinsohn, and Nathaniel Spang for their
excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to John Necci, Larry Reilly, and the staff
of the Temple University Law Library for their gracious and helpful work.
1. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-69, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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variable annuities with tax-deferred moneys from their Individual
Retirement Accounts ("IRAs") and 401(k)s.
As a result of these misleading sales practices, tens to hundreds of
millions of dollars that ought to have provided retirement security to
average Americans have instead been counted as profits by life
insurance companies or commissions by their agents. To make matters
worse, once the fraudulent nature of these transactions was brought to
the attention of investors by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), the
news media, and plaintiffs' attorneys, the investors found themselves
barred from pursuing a judicial remedy by the business friendly
provisions of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("Uniform
Standards Act" or "SLUSA) 2 and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform Act" or "PSLRA) 3 -the very acts that were
meant to enhance corporate disclosure to benefit investors.
Throughout the mid- and late-twentieth century, large companies
compensated their employees with more than cash renumeration by
providing a variety of benefits. Employees enjoyed benefits such as
health and life insurance, discounts on products sold by their employer
and its affiliates or partners, day care for their children, company cars,
subsidized meals, paid vacation and sick days, and pensions.
Two recent trends have resulted in a significant decrease in the
prevalence of these benefits. First, fewer Americans are spending their
entire careers working for the large corporations that have historically
provided these types of benefits. Second, the companies themselves are
offering less generous perquisites. Specifically, the kinds of pensions
that were once a mainstay of the typical long-term corporate employ-
ment arrangement are no longer available to the average worker. While
fixed benefit retirement plans were the norm for decades, today's
workers no longer have the luxury of such dependable sources of
retirement income. The government has stepped in and attempted to fill
the gap with IRAs, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and other tax-deferred qualified
plans. What the government has not done, and cannot do, is provide the
expertise that corporate pension administrators have long wielded for
the benefit of employees. As a result, individuals in the last twenty to
thirty years have shouldered the responsibility of planning for their own
retirements through management of their savings accounts and the
2. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-69, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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purchase of investment instruments with moneys from various sources,
including IRAs and 401(k)s.
But mom and pop investors are not usually qualified to navigate the
shark-infested waters of the investment industry. The well-to-do
typically have employed stock brokers, experts in the field upon whom
the law imposes a fiduciary duty vis-A-vis the client. Stock brokers,
however, have traditionally been an accessory of the affluent. Who
advises the less well off? A breed of investment professionals known as
financial advisors has come forward to serve the broad segment of the
public whose account balances are too meager to appeal to white-shoe
brokers. The aggressive sales practices of investment advisors and the
companies they represent have caused many middle class investors to
make ill-advised purchases of products that carry excessive fees,
Licensed and regulated by the states, investment advisors are
sometimes employed by large insurance or financial services companies,
and are sometimes independent, like insurance agents. In fact,
frequently they are also insurance agents. Middle-class Americans, with
modest amounts of money to invest, sometimes encounter investment
advisors in the small offices or shop fronts conveniently located in
shopping centers and malls. A degree of legitimacy is conferred by the
familiar brand names under which these advisors operate: American
Express Financial Planners and Nationwide Financial Advisors, for
example. The consumer's familiarity with the investment company's
brand name frequently engenders a sense of confidence and trust that
is not always well placed.
A recent example of the dangers of such encounters provides a
cautionary tale about the vulnerability of today's middle class investors
seeking to provide themselves the kind of financial security in retire-
ment that a career at IBM or Ford Motor Corporation once offered. The
confluence of profit-motivated companies, their commission-driven sales
people, and unsophisticated investors has produced a financial windfall
for the companies and their agents. It has also cost their clients
substantial sums of money and produced a great deal of litigation in
recent years.
Variable annuities are a hybrid security and life insurance product
that offer investors the appealing combination of tax-deferred investment
growth and a guaranteed lifetime income. The importance of these
benefits cannot be underestimated. As all but the wealthiest individuals
know, when retirement age approaches and one contemplates terminat-
ing all earned income and relying solely on investment income, one fears
that one's assets will not be sufficient to generate enough income for life.
The worst scenario is to be old and infirm, with rising medical expenses
and a dwindling nest egg. These concerns tend to induce aging
2004] 683
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individuals to work longer and to trim their spending in an effort to
allay their fears of asset depletion. Such concerns also induce forward-
looking workers to seek ways to maximize their retirement savings.
The benefits of variable annuities are manifest and appealing, but
they come at a price. The sales commissions, fees, and charges
associated with annuities are higher than for other insurance and
investment products. Obviously, salesmen who work mainly for
commissions will want to sell the products from which they derive the
most money. This is where the trouble begins. Because both the
advisors, at the point of sale, and the insurance companies, whose
products they sell, make high margins on the sales of annuities,
salesmen exert a great deal of pressure on consumers to buy them. In
addition to pressure from the companies, the advisors have their own
private incentives to increase their sales of annuities.
If annuities are such great retirement vehicles, then what is the
problem with investors buying them in great quantity? The problem is
that unsophisticated individuals of modest wealth do not frequently have
$100,000 lying idle in their savings accounts. However, they often do
have substantial sums amassed in their IRAs and 401(k)s. So with
vigorous encouragement from sales agents, they purchase the annuities
with the money in those tax-qualified plans and get the tax-deferred
investment and the guaranteed lifetime income. If this strikes you as
troublesome, then you are in good company. You are in the company of
plaintiffs' lawyers, knowledgeable investors, regulators, and the
executives and investment advisors working for the companies who sell
annuities. If nothing seems amiss, then you are also in excellent
company with the millions of consumers who have purchased expensive
deferred annuities with moneys from their qualified plans.
The problem is that when investors buy variable annuities using funds
from tax qualified plans, they are buying something they already have
by operation of law-tax deferral-and they are paying dearly for it.
The investor realizes no incremental benefit from the second dose of tax
deferral. This belt-and-suspenders approach to sales of annuities earned
hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues for the insurance industry
and eventually generated huge fees for lawyers representing both
plaintiffs and defendants in ensuing litigation. Beginning in 1998,
plaintiffs' firms sued several leading life insurance companies, alleging
that the sales of variable annuities into qualified plans amounted to
fraud, deceptive trade practices, negligent misrepresentation, and breach
of fiduciary duty. In 2000 the federal courts of appeals began dismissing
these cases on the grounds that the claims were preempted by the
Uniform Standards Act.
684 [Vol. 55
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Part I of this Article explains the text and legislative history of the
Reform Act of 1995 and the Uniform Standards Act of 1998. Specifically,
Part I highlights the lack of attention with which the crucial definition
of "covered security" in the 1998 law was drafted.4 Part II explains the
investment instrument known as the variable annuity and its fundamen-
tal inappropriateness as an investment for many purchasers, namely
those buying a variable annuity to place into a tax-qualified plan such
as an IRA or 401(k). Part III describes changes in the ways Americans
and their employers provide for retirement security. Part III also
demonstrates that because of those changes, purchasers of annuities
have suffered important financial harms that should not go unremedied.
Part IV explains how this problem was addressed on multiple fronts by
various institutions. Part IV further shows how the Reform Act and the
Uniform Standards Act operated to decapitate a judicial process that
seemed to be leading toward a resolution of the problem. Part V reveals
the upshot of the legislative preemption of the annuities cases and
provides some statistics indicating that any disciplinary effect that
would have been accomplished by the responses outlined in Part IV has
been totally undercut by the inability of plaintiffs to gain meaningful
access to the courts.
I. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 AND
THE SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1998
A. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
In 1995, after achieving substantial electoral gains and eager to
implement the Contract with America, the Republican Congress followed
through on a promise to enact meaningful tort reform by changing the
way economic torts are litigated.5 On December 22, 1995, Congress
enacted, over a presidential veto, a major piece of securities litigation
reform legislation.6 The Reform Act was promoted as a means of
protecting the high-tech industry from abusive securities fraud class
actions in the federal courts.7 Aimed at reducing frivolous strike suits,8
4. Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 83 State. 3227, 3230 (1998).
5. See Edmund L. Andrews, Republicans Agree to Soften A Bill to Curb Investor Suits,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1995, at Al.
6. Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
7. Many of the witnesses invited to testify at hearings on the Reform Act were
executives at or financiers of high technology companies, or representatives of high-tech
industry associations. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings on S. 240,
S. 667, and H.R. 1058, Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 21 (1995) (Statement of George H. Sollman,
2004] 685
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the Reform Act changed the securities laws in three significant ways.
First, its heightened pleading provisions required plaintiffs to plead with
particularity the facts that support a claim of fraud.9 Second, it
imposed a mandatory stay of discovery in securities class actions while
a motion to dismiss is pending.' ° Third, it provided a "safe harbor" for
forward-looking statements made by issuers." This safe harbor
provision was intended to encourage corporate executives to speak more
freely about their company, its products, and its financial prospects, by
limiting plaintiffs' ability to sue on the basis of those projections. 12
The heightened pleading rules and the discovery stay, when taken
together, represent a powerful procedural shield for defendants. In the
earliest stages of litigation, even before a complaint is filed, plaintiffs'
attorneys often gather information in a catch-as-catch-can fashion: They
collect snatches of information from whatever sources they can find,
frequently relying on leaks originating from within potential defendant
companies.1" Plaintiffs commonly base their pleadings upon "informa-
tion and belief," and then flesh out their allegations with information
amassed during discovery.' 4  The new pleading standards require
President and Chief Executive Officer, Centigram Communications Corp., on Behalf of the
American Electronics Association) [hereinafter Sollman Statement] (explaining the "effect
that abusive securities lawsuits are having on high-growth, high-tech companies"); See also
id. at 36-39 (prepared Statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici) [hereinafter Domenici State-
ment] (asserting that a main victim of strike suits are the "high-growth, high-technology
companies which are the backbone of our economy and the foundation of our ability to
compete in the new global marketplace"). See Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Bill That Would
Limit Suits of Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995, at Al.
8. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE ON THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, S.
REP. No. 104-98, at 8-12 (1995).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (2000).
12. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 16.
13. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 497, 520-21 (1997) (explaining the difficulty of obtaining evidence to support
allegations before defendant's files are pried open by discovery).
14. Id. at 520. While Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already required
plaintiffs to plead allegations of fraud with particularity, Congress was not satisfied with
the rigor with which that rule had been interpreted. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The Reform Act
therefore requires that "the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). See
also JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONF., STATEMENT OF MANAG-
ERS-THE "PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995," H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-369, at 41 (1995) (explaining Congress's dissatisfaction with judicial enforcement of
HeinOnline  -- 55 Mercer L. Rev. 686 2003-2004
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plaintiffs to obtain specific facts prior to filing the complaint, while the
discovery stay deprives them of the most powerful means of collecting
such information.
The safe harbor for forward-looking statements also has important
implications for the litigation process, cordoning off from judicial
scrutiny certain communications that convey the issuer's beliefs about
the future. 5 Protected communications include statements containing
projections of revenues, earnings per share, income, dividends, or other
financial items; statements regarding management's objectives or plans
for future operations; and statements describing the assumptions
underlying management's assessments about the future.'" But this
provision reflected more than a policy judgment about how litigation
should be conducted; it had a much more ambitious and important goal.
Enactment of the safe harbor provision was premised upon Congress's
belief that such protections would enhance the efficiency of the capital
markets by injecting more high-quality information into the mix of
information relied upon by the market, in turn making investing less
risky and decreasing the cost of raising capital.'" Corporate managers,
no longer inhibited by fear of litigation, would disclose more information,
and both issuers and investors would be better off.'"
In extensive legislative hearings and deliberations leading to the
passage of the Reform Act, Congress heard a great deal of testimony
from securities industry leaders as well as many representatives of the
high-technology sector.'9 Fully aware that attempts to erect barriers
to investor suits for damages would be politically unpopular, Congress
sought to make the reform measures palatable by portraying them as an
attempt to free a powerful engine of economic growth, the high-tech
industry, from the drag of abusive securities litigation. 20 This strategy
was opportunistic for two reasons. First, investing in technology
Rule 9(b)), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (2000).
16. Id. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5.
17. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 5.
18. Id. at 16. The Senate report quoted one-time SEC Chairman Richard Breeden
asserting that '[sihareholders are also damaged due to the chilling effect of the current
system on the robustness and candor of disclosure. Understanding a company's own
assessment of its future potential would be among the most valuable information
shareholders and potential investors could have about a firm." Id. at 15-16. The report
continued, "[flear that inaccurate projections will trigger the filing of a securities fraud
lawsuit has muzzled corporate management." Id. at 16.
19. See Sollman Statement, supra note 7; see also Domenici Statement, supra note 7.
20. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 33 (pointing out that twenty-four of the forty largest member
firms of the American Electronics Association had been sued for securities fraud and
stating, "there seems to be a pattern of targeting high technology companies"). Id.
2004] 687
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companies was on its way to becoming a national obsession. The stock
market had begun to soar, especially the tech-heavy NASDAQ, and as
long as their portfolios were rising, bullish investors were happy to free
these new economy thoroughbreds from the yoke of excessive litigation.
Second, because high-tech companies frequently experienced major
fluctuations in stock prices, they were seen as a prime target for
unscrupulous plaintiffs' lawyers bringing meritless class actions under
the securities laws.21 With the exuberance generated by leaders of the
new economy, Congress was able to portray these firms as Exhibit A for
the need to substantially overhaul the way securities litigation was
conducted. On December 22, 1995, Congress overrode President
Clinton's veto of the Reform Act.
22
1. An Impatient Congress Assesses the Impact of the Reform
Act. Having achieved this landmark reform, Congress might have been
expected to sit back and admire its handiwork. Of particular importance
to all observers was how the courts were going to interpret the
heightened pleading requirements.2 3 Specifically, confusion existed
about whether the new law raised the scienter standard under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act to require a showing of intent to defraud, as
opposed to the more easily met recklessness standard that had prevailed
in many jurisdictions, including, most importantly, the Second Cir-
cuit.
24
Many litigators and academics kept a keen eye on the specifics of
judicial interpretation of the Reform Act, while other, more easily
comprehensible effects of the law became the focus of legislators. The
net reduction in the number of securities class actions filed seemed to be
the touchstone for the industry leaders and congressmen who pushed
hard for the passage of the Reform Act. 26 To the extent that the goal
21. Id. at 16. The Senate Report stated that "high-growth businesses-because of the
volatility of their stock prices-are particularly vulnerable to securities fraud lawsuits
when projections do not materialize." Id.
22. Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
23. Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV 1, 35 (1998).
24. President Clinton's message accompanying his veto of H.R. 1058 explained that he
would have signed the bill had it contained (among other things) a provision adopting the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals pleading requirements. VETO OF H.R. 1058, MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-150, at 1, 2 (1995).
25. See REPORT ON SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1998, H.R.
REP. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998).
26. See The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 1260
Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
105th Cong. 6 (1997) (opening statement of Representative Anna G. Eshoo) (citing statistics
688 [Vol. 55
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of the Reform Act was to reduce the number of weak securities class
actions filed while not unduly burdening meritorious ones, all were eager
to appraise its effectiveness. 27 Simple tabulation of the filing, dismiss-
ing, and settling of securities class actions was one simple method of
evaluating the success of the Reform Act. A second technique, more
qualitative and cumbersome, would have been to examine all of the cases
and assess their relative strength (both those that met the new pleading
standards and those that were dismissed for failing to do so) as
compared to those brought in the years preceding the passage of the
Reform Act. The latter technique would have required years of research
and analysis but would have painted a more nuanced and complete
picture of the impact of the Reform Act.2" Such findings would have
helped Congress ascertain whether it had achieved the proper balance
between promoting corporate efficiency and protecting investors from
fraud. Moreover, additional time was needed to determine whether the
safe harbor provision of the Reform Act produced the desired effect.
2. The Debate Over Preemption. Congress was not so patient.
The dust kicked up by the Reform Act had scarcely begun to settle when,
in 1996, less than one year after its enactment, additional reform
proposals began to emerge. 29  By October 1997 nearly identical bills
were introduced in both the House and Senate, aimed at responding to
the perception that the goals of the Reform Act were being undermined
by securities class actions brought in state courts.30 The main purpose
on the number of securities class actions filed in state and federal courts) [hereinafter S.
HRG. 105-420].
27. Id.
28. Indeed, this approach was advocated by a cadre of legal academics led by Professor
Richard Painter. A letter signed by twenty-three securities law professors suggested that
before moving forward with preemption legislation, Congress should make detailed findings
on several questions: (i) Whether a significant number of suits will migrate from federal
to state courts because of the 1995 Act; (ii) whether these suits have less merit than suits
filed in federal court; (iii) whether state courts will allow plaintiffs to use parallel state
court litigation to circumvent the new limitations on discovery in federal court; (iv) whether
most states will continue the current trend toward conforming state law to the decidedly
pro-defendant leanings of the federal law; and (v) whether state courts or legislatures will
endorse efforts to create nationwide classes of plaintiffs in state court, and if so, whether
the defendants in these suits will have significant contacts with the state in question. See
144 S. CONG. REc. S4784 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (letter from Ian Ayres et al., Securities
Law Professors, to Senators and Members of Congress (Jan. 23, 1998)).
29. Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State
Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 684 (describing early activity in the effort to pass preemption
legislation).
30. House Bill 1689 was introduced by Anna Eshoo (D-Cal.) and Rick White (R-Wash.).
See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997). Senate Bill 1260 was introduced by Phil Gramm (R-
20041 689
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of these bills was to preempt securities fraud class actions brought in
state court under the legislative and common law of the states.
3 1
Proponents of Senate Bill 1260 and House Bill 1689 explained the
need for such a sweeping measure by explaining that the Reform Act left
a "loophole."3 2 As one Senate cosponsor, Christopher Dodd, stated:
In general, I believe that the 1995 Reform Act ... is working pretty
well. In fact... it's working so well on the Federal level that weaker
claims have migrated from Federal courts to State courts ... a
development that threatens ... the success that we have achieved to
date in this general area.
Moreover, without a national standard for liability, the potential threat
is always there that one State will change its laws in such a way as to
become the haven for litigation. This almost happened in California
last year with Proposition 211. The potential remains it could
successfully happen elsewhere in the future.'
To support the view that the Reform Act left the job half done, the
backers of the bills relied primarily on two sources: (1) data generated
by Stanford Law School's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,3 4 and
(2) a report by Stanford Professors Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A.
Perino.35 The picture painted by these reports showed a world in which
securities class actions had migrated from the federal courts to the state
courts, particularly the California state courts.3 ' The logic of this
sequence of events seems self-evident-make it harder to sue in federal
court and clever lawyers will sue in state court-and the reports seemed
Tex.), Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), and Peter V. Domenici (R-N.M.) with ten cosponsors.
See S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997).
31. H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 9 ("The purpose of this title is to prevent plaintiffs from
seeking to evade the protections that Federal law provides against abusive litigation by
filing in [s]tate, rather than in [flederal court.").
32. See S. HRG. 105-420, supra note 26, at 2.
33. Id. at 15.
34. The Clearinghouse is an internet site launched in 1996 that amasses data about
and filings from class action lawsuits. See Securities Class Action Clearinghouse at
http://securities.stanford.edu/ (Nov. 13, 2003).
35. See S. HRG. 105-420, supra note 26, at 66-81 (prepared Statement of Michael A.
Perino) (explaining his findings and the findings of the Securities Class Action Clearing-
house and citing Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273, 302-14 (1998) (providing statistics
showing an increase in state court class action filings in the wake of the Reform Act) and
Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working
Paper No. 140, Feb. 1997)).
36. See id. at 67-69.
690 [Vol. 55
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to provide the data to prove it. 37 But as many commentators noted, the
evidence was not as clear-cut as many lawmakers made it out to be.3 8
The findings of these two reports were summarized in the Cornell Law
Review by Professor Richard Painter, who concluded:
The statistical data, however, do not provide strong evidence of either
a lasting substitution effect or a substantial increase in the number of
parallel claims filed after 1995. The data compiled at Stanford Law
School's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, show that plaintiffs
sued 110 companies in federal court in all of 1996, and eighty-three
companies in the first six months of 1997 (an increase on an annual
basis).... [The Grundfest-Perino study] reports that plaintiffs sued
seventy companies in state court in all of 1996, and twenty-four
companies in the first six months of 1997 (a decrease on an annual
basis). The Stanford database does not include pre-1996 state court
filings. Nonetheless, the Grundfest-Perino study compared the 1996
and 1997 figures with the number of filings before 1996 and "speculat-
ed that these figures represented an increase in state court filings,
based on anecdotal reports that securities class action litigation was
rarely filed in state court prior to the [1995] Reform Act." The
speculative nature of this conclusion did not keep it from taking on a
life of its own and eventually making its way into the Findings section
of the Uniform Standards Act ....
Indeed, when Senate Bill 1260 was reported out of the conference
committee, the House and Senate managers of the bill cited Grundfest
and Perino's analysis in the House-Senate Conference Committee's Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference:
"The evidence presented in this report suggests that the level of class
action securities fraud litigation has declined by about a third in
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Painter, supra note 23, at 42-46 (reviewing and explaining the findings
of four major studies on the impact of the Reform Act). Professor Painter was a vocal
opponent of the Uniform Standards Act and explained his opposition and his analysis of
the data as a witness in hearings before the House and Senate. See also Eugene P. Caiola,
Comment: Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 337-38 (2000) (noting the ambiguity of the
evidence and its tendency to indicate that state court filings had decreased in 1997); Robin
Generous, Note and Commentary: Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Insurance Co.:
Variable Annuities and the Future of Market Conduct Controls Post-SLUSA, 8 CONN. INS.
L.J. 505, 514 (2001-02) ("Studies prompting passage of SLUSA have also been criticized.
Congress was presented with statistics showing an increase in state class actions ...
following adoption of PSLRA, suggesting a loophole to evade PSLRA requirements;
however, other studies suggest that the increase was temporary and not directly related
to PSLRA avoidance.").
39. Painter, supra note 23, at 42-43.
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federal courts, but that there has been an almost equal increase in the
level of state court activity, largely as a result of a 'substitution effect'
whereby plaintiffs resort to state court to avoid the new, more
stringent requirements of federal cases. There has also been an
increase in parallel litigation between state and federal courts in an
apparent effort to avoid the federal discovery stay or other provisions
of the Act. This increase in state activity has the potential not only to
undermine the intent of the Act, but to increase the overall cost of
litigation to the extent that the Act encourages the filing of parallel
claims." '°
The conference report continued:
Prior to the passage of the Reform Act, there was essentially no
significant securities class action litigation brought in State court. In
its Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year of
Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
the SEC called the shift of securities fraud cases from Federal to State
court "potentially the most significant development in securities
litigation" since passage of the Reform Act.41
Opponents of preemption brought to the debate data compiled by both
the National Economics Research Associates, Inc. ("NERA")42 -an
economics consulting firm-and a 1998 study by Price Waterhouse.43
The data collected by NERA included the number of state court filings
in 1994 and 1995, showing that state court filings went up after the
passage of the Reform Act." But NERA's data also included figures
from 1997 showing that state court activity had substantially reverted
to pre-1995 levels.45 The Price Waterhouse study largely corroborated
these conclusions.4 6 These findings suggest that the evidence at hand
during the preemption debate was incomplete and inconclusive.4 7 All
40. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 14 (1998) (quoting Grundfest & Perino, supra note
35).
41. Id.
42. See DENISE N. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOC., RECENT TRENDS IV:
WHAT EXPLAINS FILINGS AND SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? Iii, tbl. 10c
(1996) [hereinafter 1996 NERA Study]; DENISE N. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH
ASSOC., FEDERAL SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION FILINGS RISE TO PRE-REFORM ACT LEVELS
AS STATE FILINGS FALL 1-2, tbl. 2 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 NERA Study]; see also Painter,
supra note 23, at 43-46 (analyzing and summarizing the findings of the NERA Studies as
well as the entire body of empirical evidence considered by Congress).
43. See PRICE WATERHOUSE L.L.P., PRICE WATERHOUSE SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY
1 (1998); see Painter, supra note 23, at 42-45.
44. See 1996 NERA Study, supra note 42, at 37, tbl. 4.
45. See 1997 NERA Study, supra note 42, at tbl. 1.
46. See Painter, supra note 23, at 43-44.
47. Id.
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of this uncertainty was neatly encapsulated in the statement of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman of the SEC: "I [do not] oppose reform, only reform that
is too sweeping, and reform that is too hasty. [Let us] not replace the
race to the courthouse with a race to the Capitol. It will take more time
to gauge the effectiveness of the [1995 Reform] Act."4' Furthermore,
little evidence was available on the impact of the safe harbor provision
of the Reform Act.
3. The Impact of the Safe Harbor Provision. Substantial
theoretical and ideological emphasis is given to disclosure and transpar-
ency as a cure for many of the problems that plague the smooth
functioning of the capital markets and the issuers and investors that
rely on them.4 9 Disclosure is also viewed as an important substitute for
governmental regulation and oversight.5 ° Indeed, a key animating
principle behind the entire securities regulation regime is to encourage
the production and dissemination of information in order to enhance the
public's ability to invest in the capital markets. Rather than insisting
on governmental command and control of the management of capital, the
American system requires primarily that private actors disclose their
actions.
The safe harbor provision of the Reform Act-an attempt to encourage
disclosure-was therefore an important experiment aimed at improving
the overall quality of information available to aid the public in making
investment choices. But the ephemeral nature of disclosure, and its
impact on investor decisionmaking, gives rise to difficulties in assessing
the relationship between the two. Any evaluation of the overall success
of the safe harbor was bound to require a great deal of time and a very
sensitive analysis. The early evidence was tentative and conflicting. A
Cornell Law Review article noted that a 1997 SEC staff report suggested
that companies were not leaping to rely on the safe harbor but offered
neither empirical data nor explanations.5 ' One possible explanation
48. Securities Litigation Abuses, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 11 (1997) (opening statement
of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt) [hereinafter Opening Statement of Arthur Levitt].
49. See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989)
("The Securities and Exchange Commission believes that markets correctly value the
securities of well-followed firms, so that new sales may rely on information that has been
digested and expressed in the security's price.").
50. See Larry A. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of
General Partnerships, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 26-36 (suggesting the possibility of opting
out of the federal securities laws where private ordering would be more efficient).
51. See Painter, supra note 23, at 46.
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was that issuers were taking the rational step of waiting to see how the
federal courts would interpret the Reform Act.
On the other hand, a 1998 study reported an "'increase in both the
frequency of firms issuing forecasts and the mean number of forecasts
issued."'5 2 In fact, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, a leading
advisor to Silicon Valley issuers, counseled its clients in early 1998 to
rely on the safe harbor.5" Those eager to pass additional reform
legislation took the position that there would be little reliance on the
safe harbor because the possibility of liability in state court suits
effectively negated the existence of the safe harbor:54 Without uniform
standards in the state and federal courts, there really was no safe
harbor.5 5 Opponents of preemption legislation urged a wait-and-see
approach.56 Rather than waiting for a clearer picture to emerge,
however, Congress seized the political moment and hurtled forward with
the next stage of its reform initiative.
B. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
On November 3, 1998, Congress passed a companion to the Reform
Act, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.17 The
purpose of the legislation was to "prevent plaintiffs from seeking to
evade the protections that Federal law provides against abusive
litigation by filing suit in State, rather than in Federal, court."58 To
accomplish this aim, the Uniform Standards Act provides that:
[N]o covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of
any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or
52. Painter, supra note 23, at 46, 33 n.165 (quoting Marilyn Johnson et al., The Impact
of Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High
Technology Firms 23 (Jan. 2, 1998) (finding "that there was a significant post-1995 Reform
Act increase in both the frequency of firms issuing forecasts and the mean number of
forecasts issued")).
53. Id. at 46-47 n.259 (citing an article by Boris Feldman published on the Wilson
Sonsini website stating that "'[t]he safe harbor will go far toward eliminating the classic
fraud-by-hindsight suit filed when a company fails to satisfy quarterly earnings expecta-
tions.'"). See Boris Feldman, Financial Fraud in the Era of Securities Reform, at http://
www.wsgr.com/resource/sec_lit/recent/finfraud.htm.
54. See 144 CONG. REc. E1390, E1391 (daily ed. July 22, 1998) (speech of Rep. Anna
Eshoo) ("As long as the threat of state court actions remains, the safe harbor reform will
never be implemented.").
55. Id. at E1391.
56. See Opening Statement of Arthur Levitt, supra note 48, at 11.
57. Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.
58. 144 CONG. REC. H11020 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Comm. of Conf.).
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Federal court by any private party alleging... (1) an untrue statement
or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security; or (2) that the defendant used or employed any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.59
1. The Uniform Standard Act's Definition of Covered Secur-
ity. Among the many legislators who believed there was a problem
with securities class actions, the common understanding was that the
Uniform Standards Act, in tandem with the Reform Act, was going to
make it harder for plaintiffs' attorneys to harass publicly traded
companies.60 This understanding was reinforced by the frequent
characterizations of "strike suits" as a rush to the courthouse to file a
cookie cutter complaint every time a company's share price dropped ten
percent on the NASDAQ or New York Stock Exchange.6 Throughout
the congressional deliberations, backers of the Uniform Standards Act
repeatedly stated that the purpose of the Act was to preempt state law
claims of fraud in connection with the sale of nationally traded
securities, especially securities issued by high-technology companies.62
This was the plain language understanding of all who considered the
bill. But as we will see in Part IV-C, the ultimate definition of "covered
securities" encompassed some kinds of investments that were not
contemplated by the lawmakers.63 Under the Uniform Standards Act,
a "covered security" is one that meets the definition of "a covered
security specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of section [18(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933] at the time during which it is alleged that the
misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct
occurred. . .."6'
It turns out that this two-pronged definition is an extremely broad
one. Under section 18(b)(1), a covered security is one that is either
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000).
60. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8-12.
61. See S. HRG. 105-420, supra note 26, at 6, 7.
62. Id. at 2. For example, in his opening statement at the first Senate hearing on S.
1260, Senator Gramm said, "We have had many companies, especially new growth
companies, plagued with abusive lawsuits, often being forced to settle out of court because
of the high costs of proving innocence. We had a system of parasites who were literally
bleeding the life blood out of growth companies in America."
63. As noted in Lander v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., the voluminous legislative
history of both the Reform Act and the Uniform Standards Act contains no reference to
variable annuities. 251 F.3d 101, 110 (2nd Cir. 2001).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(3) (2000) (defining "covered securities" according to § 18(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b), which was added to the Securities Act by
NSMIA, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3417 (1996)).
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"listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the
American Stock Exchange, or listed.., on the Nasdaq Stock Market,"
65
or issued by "the same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is a senior
security to" a security of the previous classification. 6 In plain English,
this prong refers to the kinds of securities that anyone would recognize
as a publicly traded security. Under the second prong of the definition,
section 18(b)(2), a security is a covered security "if such security is a
security issued by an investment company that is registered, or that has
filed a registration statement, under the Investment Company Act of
1940. "67 By contrast, this second class of covered securities is not
necessarily what leaps to mind when one envisions the kind of securities
that are the targets of strike suits. In fact, this class was characterized,
rather imprecisely, in the legislative history as referring to mutual
funds.68 But, to the substantial detriment of millions of Americans who
have invested in variable annuities, it turned out to cover more than just
mutual funds.6 We will return to this last category of covered securi-
ties and to the aggrieved investors with greater attention later.
The Uniform Standards Act progressed through the House and Senate
in the form of House Bill 168970 and Senate Bill 1260.7' As men-
tioned, the goal of these two bills was "to make Federal court the
exclusive venue for most securities fraud class action litigation involving
nationally traded securities."7 2 Although the two bills were almost
completely identical, they contained small but important differences.
One of these differences related to the number of plaintiffs required to
constitute a "covered class action."7 " But the most significant difference
between the two final versions of the Uniform Standards Act concerned
the aforementioned definition of "covered security."
7 4
65. Pub. L. No. 104-290 §102 (b)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at 3418 (1996).
66. Id. § 102(b)(1)(C). Under this part of the definition, suits alleging fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of high yield (junk) bonds are not preempted because
they are of lower seniority than the issuer's other outstanding securities.
67. Id. § 102(b)(2).
68. See Prepared Statement of Arthur Levitt, infra note 79.
69. See infra Part TV-C.
70. H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997).
71. S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997).
72. 144 CONG. REc. H11021.
73. The House bill initially defined "covered class action" as 'any single lawsuit, or any
group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court involving common questions of law
or fact, in which. . . damages are sought on behalf of more than 25 persons." H.R. 1689,
§ 16(d)(1). The Senate bill defined the term as those actions in which "damages are sought
on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class members . . . ." S. 1260, § 16(f)(2).
The final bill adopted the Senate's definition.
74. See H.R. 1689, § 16(d)(2); S. 1260, § 16(f)(3).
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The House version, as introduced, provided that a security was a
covered security "if the issuer of the security had outstanding any
security that satisfied the standard for a covered security specified in
Section 18(b)(1) of [the Securities Act] at any time during which it is
alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or
deceptive conduct occurred."7" This definition was broad in the sense
that it classified covered securities based on whether the issuer had any
listed securities, whether or not the security in question was actually
traded publicly on any major national exchange.
When Senate Bill 1260 was introduced, it used a definition that was
narrower in one sense, yet broader in another crucial sense. It provided
that a security is a "covered security" if it "satisfies the standards for a
covered security specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of Section 18(b) [of the
Securities Act]."76 Under this definition, the focus was on the character
of the security itself, not on whether the issuer had other publicly traded
securities. This focus limited the scope of the definition. However, the
distinction that makes a difference in this Article was the inclusion of
section 18(b)(2) covered securities (those casually referred to in the
legislative history as mutual funds)." As a result of the incorporation
of section 18(b)(2) in the definition of covered securities, any issuer
required to register its securities under the Investment Company Act of
1940"' gained the protections of the Uniform Standards Act. We will
see in Part IV-C that this definition turned out to include variable
annuities, a complicated but extremely widely held investment vehicle.
2. Overbreadth and Oversight in the Definition of Covered
Securities. A fair amount of legislative attention was given to the
scope of the preemption effectuated by the Uniform Standards Act, but
little was said about the decision to include or exclude the section
18(b)(2) prong of the definition.79 Rather, the legislators and witnesses
75. H.R. 1689, § 16(d)(2) (emphasis added).
76. S. 1260, § 16(f)(3).
77. See Prepared Statement of Arthur Levitt, infra note 79.
78. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-51 (2000).
79. The Prepared Statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, seems to have been the catalyst for the ultimate decision to include the
Section 18(b)(2) prong of the definition of covered security. In conclusory fashion, Levitt
stated that "[s]hares of closed-end investment companies are deemed covered securities
under H.R. 1689 because they trade over national exchanges. There is no reason why the
definition should not be extended to also reach open-end investment companies." Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, Hearing on H.R. 1689 Before the Subcomm. on
Finance and Hazardous Materials, H.R. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 23 (1998)
(prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission) [hereinafter Prepared Statement of Arthur Levitt].
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focused on two major problems with the definition. First, in testimony
during legislative hearings, Professor Jack Coffee argued that the
definition was defective because it was categorical. 80 Professor Coffee
pointed out that debt instruments usually contain negotiated covenants
and other provisions that are drafted to permit bondholders to sue over
false statements in offering documents under more lenient standards of
proof than those required in a federal common law action for fraud or by
the scienter requirement associated with 10b-5 actions.8 1 A bill that
insulated such agreements from judicial enforcement would eviscerate
those private arrangements that are negotiated in detail at great cost,
thereby depriving bondholders of the benefit of their bargained-for
agreement.82 Common sense prevailed and Congress included in the
Uniform Standards Act an exception from preemption for any class
action "that seeks to enforce a contractual agreement between an issuer
and an indenture trustee."
83
Another concession was extracted by those who urged that preemption
should not extend to actions brought by a "State or political subdivision
thereof or a State pension plan ... on its own behalf, or as a member of
a class comprised solely of [similar entities]." 84 The need for this carve-
out was explained in testimony offered by representatives of the
Government Finance Officers Association and the National League of
Cities.85 These witnesses argued that public pension funds needed to
retain access to state courts to protect the enormous sums invested on
behalf of millions of public employees.8 6 With over $2.2 trillion
invested on behalf of 16.5 million members, these organizations
80. Id. at 61 (statement of Professor Jack Coffee) [hereinafter Statement of Jack
Coffee].
81. Id.; Painter, supra note 23, at 54.
82. Statement of Jack Coffee, supra note 80, at 61; Painter, supra note 23, at 54.
83. H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. §§ 101(a)(1), 101(b)(1)(B) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG.
REC. H6053 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) (amending Securities Act of 1933 section 16(d)(3) and
adding subsection (f) to section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
84. Id. § 101(a)(2) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H6053 (daily ed. July 21, 1998)
(amending section 27(b) of the 1933 Act and section 21D(b)(3) of the 1934 Act).
85. S. HRG. 105-420, supra note 26, at 56 (prepared statement of Harry Smith, Mayor,
City of Greenwood, Mississippi, on behalf of the National League of Cities) [hereinafter
Prepared Statement of Harry Smith]; The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1997, Hearing on S. 1260 Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 51 (1998) (prepared statement of J. Harry
Weatherly, Jr., Director of Finance, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, on behalf of the
Government Finance Officers Association) [hereinafter Prepared Statement of J. Harry
Weatherly, Jr.].
86. Prepared Statement of Harry Smith, supra note 85, at 56.
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persuaded Congress to exempt state and local governments, and their
pension finds, from the preemption legislation.87
In these instances, the input of witnesses animated useful debate that
improved the Uniform Standards Act by limiting the scope of preemp-
tion. But apart from a conclusory comment from Arthur Levitt generally
endorsing the appropriateness of including all mutual funds in the
definition of covered security,88 scant attention seems to have been paid
to the decision to preempt actions alleging fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities issued by investment companies. By the
time the two bills were sent to the conference committee, the difference
over whether the definition of covered securities should include section
18(b)(2) securities remained unresolved. However, when the compromise
bill was introduced it included 18(b)(2) securities in the definition of
covered securities.89 The conference report offered little insight into the
committee's decision to adopt the Senate bill's version including the
section 18(b)(2) prong of the definition.9° Referencing another securi-
ties reform initiative, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996 (NSMIA),9' the report noted that:
consistent with the determination that Congress made in the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA), this legislation
establishes uniform national rules for securities class action litigation
involving our national capital markets. Under the legislation, class
actions relating to a "covered security" (as defined by section 18(b) of
the Securities Act of 1933, which was added to that Act by NSMIA)
alleging fraud or manipulation must be maintained pursuant to the
provisions of Federal securities law, in Federal court (subject to certain
exceptions). 92
To what can we ascribe the dearth of legislative comment on the
section 18(b)(2) component of the definition? Perhaps it is that mutual
fund companies registered under the Investment Company Act were
87. Prepared Statement of J. Harry Weatherly Jr., supra note 85, at 51.
88. See Prepared Statement of Arthur Levitt, supra note 79, at 24.
89. H.R. CoNF. REP. 105-803, at 4 (1998).
90. Id.
91. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3417 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). NSMIA was passed to
reduce the duplicative regulatory requirements caused by concurrent federal and state
securities laws. NSMIA provides that any state law requiring regulation or qualification
of "covered securities" is preempted by federal law. Id. The legislative history of NSMIA
sheds no light on the policy considerations or political motivations that informed the
drafting of the definition of covered securities in the Uniform Standards Act.
92. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-803, reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H10774 (daily ed.
Oct. 13, 1998).
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never a target of strike suits and thus were not present in the conscious-
ness of the members of Congress. Yet given the radical nature of the
Reform Act's undertaking and the haste with which Congress raced to
pass the Uniform Standards Act, it seems as though lawmakers were in
no mood for minimalism or incremental steps. With no real substantive
debate over the need to preempt suits against mutual funds, the
prevailing mindset boiled down to a belief that more preemption was
better.
Despite the utterly transformative cumulative effect of these two
major acts, the legislative history of the Uniform Standards Act is
replete with proclamations that the Act represented a "targeted and
narrow" measure.93 Understanding the meaning of such statements is
difficult when the direct effect of the Act was to bar the doors of state
and federal courthouses to practically all victims of securities fraud
seeking to vindicate their claims through class actions based on state
law. When viewed in tandem with the sweeping changes of the Reform
Act, absolutely nothing is targeted and narrow about this legislation.
However, there was a problem to be addressed. To be sure, nuisance
litigation instigated by entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys can be a
drag on the economy. Defendants frequently settle these suits for
significant sums to avoid the cost and uncertainty of trying the cases
before juries. In addition to the dollar value of the settlement, defen-
dants frequently expend significant sums of money and time in the
period following the filing of the complaint. Defendants typically hire
first-rate attorneys to undertake thorough investigations of the
allegations to ascertain both the defendants' and the attorneys' potential
exposure. These firms often rack up hundreds or even thousands of
billable hours conducting extensive document reviews and exhaustive
legal research in preparation for the first major judicial battle: The
motion to dismiss. With fledgling first-year associates billing in excess
of $200 per hour,94 even the costs of this preliminary activity can be
enormous.
If the motion to dismiss is granted, the defendants have gotten off
lightly. If the motion is denied, the plaintiffs have gained the upper
93. S. HRG. 105-420, supra note 26, at 15 (opening statement of Senator Christopher
Dodd); see also id. at 5 (opening statement of Rep. Richard A. White) ("We have come up
with a very limited bill, a bill that addresses only nationally-traded securities."); but see
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard H. Bryan: "It seems to me that there is no reason
to preempt the entire body of antifraud laws of all 50 States when there are only two
claimed problems that even the proponents have identified." Id. at 39.
94. See Amy Vincent, Second Wind, THE AM. LAw., Aug. 2003 (reporting that the
standard billing rate for first year associates at large New York firms was $210 per hour,
with the rate for top partners reaching $650 per hour).
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hand as the parties move to the negotiating table. The Reform Act was
designed to dramatically alter this course of events by means of two of
its main provisions, the heightened pleading requirements and the
discovery stay.95 As mentioned earlier, plaintiffs alleging fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities must now plead with specificity the facts
that form the basis of their claim of fraud. 6 Therefore, to file a legally
sufficient complaint, plaintiffs often must have access to closely guarded
information. Before the reform legislation, plaintiffs only needed to
plead upon information and belief to gain access to inside information
through the American legal system's liberal discovery rules. Now,
plaintiffs are stymied at both stages. Not only must they plead specific
facts that form the basis of their claims, but they are stripped of access
to such information because of the discovery stay. The result is that
many plaintiffs with colorable claims of fraud will be shut out of court.
To the extent that this state of affairs is the result of a reasoned
legislative judgment carefully arrived at through an open, deliberative
process, it is simply a bitter pill to swallow for many aggrieved investors.
However, this legislative remedy for what was deemed to be a chronic
ailment of the litigation system has caused at least one harmful side
effect that has been largely overlooked. Hundreds of thousands of
retirement investors, whose retirement nest eggs shrank as a result of
fraudulent sales practices rampant in the insurance industry, were
denied the chance to have their state law claims heard in state or
federal courts.97 These investors were purchasers of variable annuities,
a group that saw their fraud claims dismissed after the passage of the
Uniform Standards Act.98
The circumstances surrounding this development seem all the more
inappropriate when one considers the degree to which these abusive
sales practices had proliferated. 99 Furthermore, various legal and
nonlegal institutions began to develop considerable momentum toward
addressing this problem."°  A great deal of news media coverage
focused on the problem of insurers inappropriately selling variable
annuities into qualified plans.'0 ' This coverage spurred the plaintiffs'
bar into action, and many suits were filed. 0 2 While some suits settled,
95. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text.
99. See infra Part V, Table 3.
100. See infra Part IV.
101. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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others were pending and more still may be brought.' In light of
judicial expansion of fiduciary liability over the decades, there was good
reason to believe that the courts would hold defendants to a heightened
duty of disclosure."' 4  The life insurance industry, in an attempt to
clean up its image, developed a program whereby companies could
undergo a review of their sales, marketing, and training practices, and
receive an honor badge proclaiming that they carried out their business
ethically.' °5 Finally, the SEC and self-regulatory bodies like the NASD
took steps to caution the public about when not to buy variable
annuities.' 6 They also warned and sanctioned those who sold variable
annuities inappropriately.' 7 All of these developments seemed to
represent progress toward a meaningful change in the way life insurance
companies sold their variable annuity products. But this multifarious
reform movement was swiftly decapitated by the Uniform Standards
Act. 108
II. SALES OF VARIABLE ANNUITIES IN QUALIFIED PLANS
Beginning in the mid-1980s, when employee participation in defined
contribution plans began blossoming in this country, 9 life insurance
companies started to experience an explosion in the sales of variable
annuities."0 Variable annuities are retirement planning vehicles sold
by life insurance companies and their registered representatives."'
They are distinguishable from mutual funds by their two-phase design
and tax-deferred status."2 In the first phase, known as the accumula-
tion or investment phase, the premiums paid by the purchaser are
invested in subaccounts, akin to mutual funds, which contain stocks,
bonds and money market instruments."' During the accumulation
103. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
104. See infra Part IV-D.
105. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
106. See infra Parts IV-A and IV-B.
107. See infra Parts IV-A and TV-B.
108. See infra Part TV-C.
109. See infra Part III-A, Table 1.
110. See infra Part V, Table 3.
111. SEC Investor Alert., Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm (modified: 11/06/2003) [hereinafter SEC
Investor Alert]. Throughout this Article, these sales agents are referred to variously as
registered representatives, brokers, financial advisors, agents and broker-dealers.
112. SEC Investor Alert, supra note 111.
113. Id. The variable annuity is so named because the value of the assets in the
investor's account will vary with the value of the subaccount. This contrasts with the fixed
annuity, in which the premiums are invested in bonds and other fixed income instruments,
producing a fixed return for the investor. Id.
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phase, the investor's money grows on a tax-deferred basis, with the gain
each year being reinvested in full, rather than being taxed.114 This is
a substantial advantage: The money in the subaccount grows much
faster over time than a comparable taxable investment, such as a
mutual fund."5  This faster growth occurs because each year the
investor is earning interest on that portion of the investment that would
be lost to government taxation if it were a taxable vehicle. 16 During
the accumulation phase, the investor may transfer the money from one
subaccount to another within the menu of subaccounts offered by the
insurer. Such transfers may be desirable as a response to a shift in the
market place or in one's attitude toward risk. However, if the investor
wishes to withdraw any of the moneys during the accumulation phase,
the insurer typically imposes substantial "surrender charges.""7
Additionally, if the withdrawal occurs before the age of fifty-nine-and-a-
half, a ten percent federal tax penalty may be assessed."8
When the accumulation phase is over, after age fifty-nine-and-a-half
by law or at a later date by contract, the payout phase begins."9 At
the start of the payout phase, the investor must choose either to receive
the balance in his account as a lump sum payment or to annuitize the
account. With the annuity option, the money accumulated during the
investment period is turned into a periodic payout, usually a stream of
monthly payments for the rest of the annuitant's lifetime. The benefit
of the annuitization is that the investor will receive a guaranteed income
for as long as he lives. The insurance company assumes the risk that
the investor will outlive his assets.'2 °
Aside from tax deferral and the security of lifetime payments to the
investor, the only other noteworthy benefit of variable annuities is the
death benefit.' 2 ' The death benefit is a fairly insignificant form of
investment insurance whereby if the purchaser dies during the
accumulation phase, a named beneficiary is guaranteed to receive at
least the amount of premiums paid.'22 If the investments in the
114. Id.
115. Not all mutual funds are taxable (for example, municipal bond funds). Gains from
mutual funds also are not taxable when the fund is placed in a qualified plan.
116. SEC Investor Alert, supra note 111.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Of course, the investor assumes the risk that she will die prematurely and
forfeit the balance of her account.
121. Id.
122. Id. The death benefit is rarely of much value to consumers because, given the
historical growth of the stock market, it is very unusual for an investor to die with a net
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subaccount lost value during the accumulation period, those losses will
be absorbed by the insurer.'23 A variant of this feature is the stepped-
up death benefit, which periodically locks in gains from the performance
of the subaccount.'24 Each insurance company provides some version
of the death benefit and a few offer other, more ancillary features, such
as long-term care benefits bundled into the variable annuity package at
an additional cost to the investor.
The benefits of a variable annuity, while attractive, come at a price:
When an investor purchases a variable annuity, the investments become
subject to various fees, charges, and commissions.'25 The average
variable annuity charges a total of 2.09 percent per year against the
assets under contract. 2 ' This rate includes an average charge of 0.82
percent per year for managing the subaccount portfolios and an average
of 1.25 percent annual "mortality and expense" ("M&E") charge.12 v
The M&E charge allegedly compensates the insurer for the actuarial risk
it takes should the investor eventually annuitize his account. 12' The
broker's commission also frequently comes out of the M&E charge. 2 9
An administrative fee, usually in the range of twenty-five to forty dollars
per year is also typical. 30 Finally, there is the surrender charge.
Usually in the range of five to nine percent, the surrender charge is a
significant restriction on liquidity, requiring the investor to pay if he
wants to withdraw funds within the first eight or ten years after the
purchase of the annuity.'3 ' The surrender charge is, in effect, a type
loss on his account. One industry insider estimated that the death benefit costs insurers
ten to fifteen basis points. See Vanessa O'Connell, Commissions Hunting: Look to 'M&E'
Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1998, at C1 (quoting Patrick Reinkemeyer, Publisher of
Morningstar Inc.'s Variable Annuity/Life Performance Report). A more rigorous and formal
examination of the cost of the simple death benefit concluded that the death benefit costs
the average fifty-year-old contract purchaser three-and-a-half basis points, and that the
stepped-up death benefit with a five percent rising floor costs twenty basis points. See
Moshe Arye Milevsky & Steven E. Posner, The Titanic Option: Valuation of the Guaranteed
Minimum Death Benefit in Variable Annuities and Mutual Funds, J. RISK & INS., Mar. 1,
2001, at 93.
123. SEC Investor Alert, supra note 111.
124. Id.
125. Mark Bautz, Money Ranks the Best Variable Annuities, MONEY, November 1996,
at 134, 135.
126. Kimberly Lankford, Boy, Have They Got a Deal for You, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN.
MAG., Apr. 1999, at 108, 110.
127. SEC Investor Alert, supra note 111.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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of sales charge and is used to pay brokers' commissions. 13 2  The
commissions can be as high as seven percent, as compared to an average
four percent commission on mutual fund sales. 3
Though these charges and fees may seem innocuous when viewed out
of context, they are actually a significant drag on the investment's
performance and a hindrance to the accumulation of wealth for
retirement. Excluding surrender charges, the standard fees, on average,
add up to 2.09 percent, and can reach as high as 2.50 percent.1 34  By
comparison, the fees associated with mutual funds average only 1.42
percent.
3 5
The comparison of fee structures between variable annuities and
mutual funds is particularly significant because, when a variable
annuity is purchased with money in a tax-sheltered account, the annuity
is the functional equivalent of a mutual fund. 36  An investor could
achieve the same financial benefits by purchasing a mutual fund (which
would be tax deferred by virtue of being placed in the IRA or 401(k)
account) and then purchasing an immediate annuity when he retires.
Nevertheless, sales of variable annuities into such tax-qualified accounts
have exploded in the last fifteen years, and this development has Caused
average investors to forfeit significant portions of their retirement
savings.3 3 For example, over a ten-year period, an investor who
purchased a typical variable annuity with $100,000 of his IRA money
would, as a result of the fees and charges, end up with $8590 less than
he would have had with a mutual fund, assuming yearly investment
earnings of ten percent.' If a loss of 8.59 percent of an average
investor's retirement savings is not that sensational a figure, consider
this: Annuity assets have hovered around $900 billion to $1 trillion
since 1999.' With at least half of those assets coming from qualified
132. Id.
133. Carolyn T. Geer, The Great Annuity Rip-off, FORBES, Feb. 9, 1998, at 106, 107.
134. Ron Panko, Can Annuities Pass Muster? Attorneys Take Insurance Companies to
Court, BEsT'S REV., July 1, 2000, at 103.
135. Id.
136. See Geer, supra note 133, at 106-07; Karen Damato, Do Annuities Belong in IRAs?,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at R23. See also infra Part III-B.
137. See infra Part V, Table 3.
138. See Deborah Lohse & Bridget O'Brian, Lawyers Seek ClassAction Against Insurers
Over Annuities, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1999, at C1.
139. VARDS Report: Historic Annual Total Net Assets, at http://www.vards.com/pdf/AH
Assetq203.pdf (2003). According to the Variable Annuity Research & Data Service
(VARDS), a variable annuities market research firm, total net assets in variable annuities
was $973,466,600 in 1999, $956,450,600 in 2000, $886,013,600 in 2001, $796,662,300 in
2002, and $880,101,000 as of June 30, 2003. Id. Other estimates are even higher. See
Lohse & O'Brian, supra note 138 (estimating $1.2 trillion in variable annuities assets in
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plans, the sellers of annuities are potentially capturing hundreds of
millions of dollars that ought to be financing Americans' retirements.
So why have investors paid so dearly to put so much tax deferred
money into an expensive tax deferred investment? The most likely
explanation is that life insurers and their representatives have foisted
this product on trusting and confused investors because the insurers
stand to make terrific profit margins on the sales. One industry insider
estimated that the death benefit costs insurers ten to fifteen basis points
(hundredths of a percent).4 ° A more rigorous and formal examination
of the cost of the simple death benefit concluded that the death benefit
costs insurer three-and-a-half basis points in the case of the average
fifty-year-old contract purchaser, and that the stepped-up death benefit
with a five percent rising floor costs twenty basis points.14 ' When
considering that the not-for-profit TIAA-CREF, a leading seller of
variable annuities to qualified plans, levies an M&E charge of only seven
basis points,'42 a clearer picture begins to emerge. The 1.25 percent
average M&E charge is almost pure profit for the insurance company.
Assuming conservatively that if the M&E charge represents a one
percent profit on all variable annuity assets under management, it is
evident that the insurers have a powerful incentive to sell variable
annuities instead of mutual funds. When this corporate profit motive is
coupled with a sales agent's incentive to earn inflated commissions, the
average investor faces a powerful persuasive force directing him to make
the wrong purchase.
Beginning in 1998, plaintiffs' firms, most notably Milberg, Weiss,
Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, sued major life insurance companies for
improper sales of variable annuities into qualified plans. Among the
defendants were Nationwide Financial Services, American Express
Financial Corp., American United Life Insurance Co., SunAmerica Inc.,
Met Life, Prudential Financial Inc., and Hartford Life Insurance Co."
The American Express Financial Corp. case settled for $215 million even
before the litigation was certified as a class action.'" Each complaint
1999).
140. See O'Connell, supra note 122 (quoting Patrick Reinkemeyer, Publisher of
Morningstar Inc.'s Variable Annuity/Life Performance Report).
141. See Milevsky & Posner, supra note 122, at 108.
142. Id.
143. Panko, supra note 134, at 103; see also Nationwide v. Nationwide Fin. Servs., Inc.
No. 98-CVH10-8393 (Ohio C.P., Franklin City) [hereinafter Nationwide Complaint];
SunAmerica v. SunAmerica, Inc. Case No. BC194082 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Los Angeles County)
[hereinafter SunAmerica Complaint]; AMEX v. American Express Fin. Corp., et al., No. MC
98-015681 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin County) [hereinafter AMEX Complaint].
144. Panko, supra note 134, at 103.
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alleged various misdeeds in the sales of annuities dating back to 1985.
But the central claim in these class actions, and the one on which the
rest of this Article will focus, is that variable annuities are inappropriate
investments for qualified plans, except in very limited circumstanc-
es.
145
Accusing defendants of breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent
concealment, and deceit, plaintiffs stressed the superior knowledge
possessed by defendants and their "failure to state facts necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading." 46 While the claims came
under various legal rubrics,'47 the theory of recovery generally boiled
down to an assertion that defendants' behavior amounted to a failure of
disclosure.
III. EVOLUTIONARY SHIFTS IN THE WAY AMERICANS WORK AND SAVE
FOR RETIREMENT
As will be explained more fully in Section III-B, providers of financial
services have demonstrated a predatory streak that the legal system has
been unable or unwilling to corral. But profit-driven corporations and
the absence of an adequate legal response only make up part of the
picture; societal changes also contribute to the need for a more vigorous
legal response to the problems outlined above. The last decades of the
twentieth century have witnessed major shifts in the way Americans
work. Once upon a time, Americans worked at the office from nine to
five, five days a week, year in and year out, until they retired with a
gold watch and a pension. They paid their dues, working loyally and
steadfastly, and were rewarded with financial security in their old age.
These days, the concept of a career no longer means that a person will
work for one or two large corporations for the duration of his work life.
145. See, e.g., SunAmerica Complaint, supra note 143, at 4-9.
146. Nationwide Complaint, supra note 143, at 9 64.
147. The causes of action pleaded in the AMEX complaint included deceptive trade
practices, false or misleading advertising, consumer fraud, fraud, fraudulent concealment
and deceit, breach of fiduciary duty/constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
negligence and negligence per se. AMEX Complaint, supra note 143, at T 5, 19, 41, 49,
52, 57, 65, 68, 74, 82, 89, 96, 103, 109. The Nationwide complaint pleaded similar causes
of action, adding negligent training and supervision. Nationwide Complaint, supra note
143, at 62, 69, 76, 83, 94, 99. The differences merely reflected differing state common
law as the Nationwide case was brought in an Ohio state court and the AMEX case was
brought in a Minnesota state court.
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The average American worker now holds nine jobs before the age of
thirty-two. 14
Loyalties between employers and employees have largely evaporated.
Until the sweeping corporate consolidations of the 1980s and the
concomitant layoffs, employees commonly moved only vertically through
a firm, rather than laterally from firm to firm and industry to industry.
There was a time when an employee could count on job security,
provided that he performed with reasonable competence and reliability,
and knew that upon retirement a pension was waiting that would allow
him to retire with an adequate lifestyle.
This romantic picture of careerism began to change dramatically and
painfully in the 1980s when firms began ruthlessly cutting costs by
trimming their workforce. As workers felt the cold sting of unexpected
layoffs and difficult mid-career job searches, an ethic of independence
developed that gave rise to today's fractured and multi-faceted career
patterns. More Americans are moving from job tojob, working freelance,
working from home, or starting their own consultancies than ever
before. 149 Adapting to the new environment involved growing pains,
but ultimately American workers saw great value in their new found
flexibility casting this change as a liberation.'
If the decrease in loyalty between labor and management came to be
viewed as a win-win scenario, then the resulting loss in retirement
security was not a mutually beneficial development. To be sure, the
employers were happy. They achieved cost cutting not only in the short
term through reduced compensation expenses, but also in the long term
by reducing the amount of capital they had to set aside for retirement
benefits. Industrial streamlining improved profitability and increased
share prices. Not only did the corporations benefit, but top managers
reaped huge rewards in the form of bonuses and stock options. However,
no reciprocal benefit was reaped by other employees. Instead, employees
found themselves struggling to develop strategies to provide for their
retirements.
148. Employment Benefits Research Institute, Issue Brief 249, An Evolving Pension
System: Trends in Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans, at 24 (Sept. 2002)
[hereinafter EBRI Issue Brief 249].
149. See, e.g., Nina Munk, The Price of Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, § 6
(Magazine), at 50; Daniel H. Pink, Free Agent Nation, FAST COMPANY, December
1997/January 1998, at 131.
150. Munk, supra note 149, at § 6. "The free agent has a much better lifestyle... they
can go snowboarding; they can decide when they want to work and when they don't want
to work. It's an incredible lifestyle. I can't really think of a better way to spend your life."
Id.
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A. Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans
The trend toward a more loosely structured work life over the last
thirty years was accompanied by changes in the way employers helped
their employees save for retirement. From the end of the second World
War until the early 1970s, defined benefit pension plans were the norm
for large private employers.15' In a defined benefit plan, the employee
is assured of a certain benefit upon retirement, usually a monthly cash
payment calculated based on the employee's tenure and annual salary
in the final years of employment. 152 The employer is responsible for
making sure that the funds needed to pay retirees are available.'53
Defined benefit plans offer employees threefold guarantees regarding
their pensions: Their pensions are guaranteed by the assets in the
pension fund itself, by the overall solvency of the employer, and finally,
by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation.TM
The alternative to a defined benefit plan is a defined contribution
pension plan, in which the employer contributes to the employee's
account via a payroll deduction. The employer maintains control of the
aggregated funds invested by all of its plan participants but must
provide a range of investment options for each employee. The most
common form of defined contribution plan is the 401(k) plan, created in
1978 when Congress added section 401(k) to the Internal Revenue
Code."'5 An essential characteristic of the 401(k) and its relatives is
that the account is the employee's property. The employer administers
the account, but the employee owns it and carries it with him as he
moves from job to job or stops working. Ultimately the employee must
be responsible for making decisions about how to invest the funds in a
defined contribution plan, and employees often do so on their own
without the guidance of a plan administrator.
Whereas defined benefit pensions used to be the predominant form of
retirement benefit in corporate America, since the late 1970s, defined
contribution plans have taken the lead. 5 6 More Americans have been
thrust into the role of guardian of their own retirement assets. In 1998,
151. See EBRI Issue Brief 249, supra note 148, at 4.
152. See Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment
Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4-5 (2002).
153. Id. at 5.
154. CPR Needed, PENSIONS & INVEsTMENTS, Apr. 19, 1999, at 10.
155. The 401(k) plan is available to employees in the private sector. A 401(a) plan or
457 plan is the equivalent of a 401(k) plan but is available to government employees. A
403(b) plan is available to employees of public schools and organizations exempt from
federal income tax under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
156. EBRI Issue Brief 249, supra note 148, at 4-5.
2004] 709
HeinOnline  -- 55 Mercer L. Rev. 709 2003-2004
MERCER LAW REVIEW
the year the annuities class actions were commenced, fifty-eight million
American workers participated in defined contribution plans, as
compared with forty-two million in defined benefit plans.'5 7 These
statistics contrast markedly with the numbers from 1975, when only
twelve million corporate employees had defined contribution plans and
thirty-three million had defined benefit plans. 15  The trend is illus-
trated more fully in Tables 1 and 2.
Many factors contributed to the shift away from defined benefit to
defined contribution plans. For one thing, Congress passed the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")159 in 1974. An
important aim of ERISA was to ensure the security of employee pensions
by forcing employers to actually fund their pension programs. 6 ° As is
often the case with well-intentioned social welfare legislation, perverse
results ensued. While full funding of defined benefit pensions was
achieved in many cases, vast numbers of employers turned away from
defined benefit plans and established 401(k)s for their workforce.16 1
By offering minimal or no matching funds, employers save on both
annual contributions and administrative costs.'62 Thus, one unintend-
ed consequence of ERISA has been that employees have had to assume
greater responsibility both in funding their retirements and making
investment decisions.
Another reason for the rise of the defined contribution plan is that
ERISA plans are complicated to administer, and the regulatory tangle
is dense and frequently changing. 6 ' Relatively speaking, the regulato-
ry requirements for defined contribution plans are fewer, simpler, and
change less frequently."6 According to one analysis of recent aggre-
gate costs of regulatory changes, the costs of administering a defined
benefit plan in 1981 was 140 percent greater than the cost of administer-
ing a 401(k) plan.1 65 By 1996 the gap had widened to 210 percent.
One of the main sources of this disparity is the cost of premiums paid to
157. Id. at 5.
158. Id. at 6.
159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1461 (2000).
160. See The Pension Temptation, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Jan. 9, 1995, at 8.
161. See id. at 4-6.
162. Id. at 8.
163. See Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, EBRI Issue Brief232, The Changing Face
of Private Retirement Plans, at 5 (Apr. 2001).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 6 (citing Edwin C. Hustead, Trends in Retirement Income Plan Administra-
tive Expenses, PRC Working Paper 96-13, University of Pennsylvania, Pension Research
Council).
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TABLE 1: Private Pension Plans and Participants
Summary of Private-Sector Qualified Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans and
Participants, Selected Years, 1975-1998
1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total Plans b 311 489 632 712 708 802 690 693 696 720 730
(Thousands)
Defined Benefit a  103 208 341 170 113 89 84 74 69 59 56
Defined Contributiona 208 341 462 599 620 619 616 624 633 661 674
Defined Contribution as 67% 70% 73% 84% 87% 88% 89% 90% 91% 92% 92%
Percentage of Total
Total Participants c 45 58 75 77 82 84 85 87 92 95 99
(Millions)
Defined Benefitc 33 38 40 39 40 40 40 40 41 40 42
Defined Contribution' 12 20 35 38 42 44 45 48 51 55 58
Defined Contribution as 26% 34% 47% 50% 52% 52% 53% 55% 55% 57% 58%
Percentage of Total
Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute tabulations based on U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits
Administration, Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of l998form 5500 Annual Reports (Winter 2001-2002).
'Excludes single-participant plans.
'Due to rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals.
'Includes active, retired, and separated vested participants not yet in pay status. Not adjusted for double counting of individuals
participating in more than one plan.
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TABLE 2: Private Plan Financial Trends
Summary of Private-Sector Qualified Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plan Trends, Selected Years 1975-1998
1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Assetsac ($Billions)
Defined Benefit
Defined Contribution
Defined Contribution
As Percentage of Total
Contributions d ($Billions)
Defined Benefitc
Defined Contribution'
Defined Contribution
As Percentage of Total
Benefit Payments ' ($Billions)
Defined Benefit
Defined Contribution
An Percontae of Total
260 564 1,674 1,936 2,094 2,316 2,299 2,724 3,136 3554 4,022
186 401 962 1,102 1,147 1,248 1211 1,402 1,585 1,736 1,937
74 162 712 834 947 1,068 1,088 1,322 1,551 1,818 2,085
28% 29% 43% 43% 45% 46% 47% 490/ 49% 51% 52%
37 66 99 111 129 154 144 159 170 178 202
24 43 23 30 35 52 39 41 36 30 35
13 24 76 81 94 102 105 117 134 148 167
35% 36% 77% 73% 73% 66% 73% 74% 79% 83% 83%
19 35 129 136 152 156 164 183 213 232 273
6 13 63 64 75 77 81 98 116 135 162
32% 37% 49/ 47% 49/ 49% 50% 53% 55% 58% 59'/6
Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute tabulations based on U.S. Department of lAbor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Private
Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 1998 form 5500 Annual Reports (Spring 1998); and Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 998form 5500 Annual
Reports (Winter 2001-2002).
'Excludes single-participant plans.
'Due to rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals.
'Excludes funds held by life insurance companies under allocated group contracts for payment of retirement benefits. These funds make up rougly 10-15
percent of total private pension plan assets.
dlncludes both employer and employee contributios.
Includes both benefits paid directly from trust and premium payments made by plans to insurance carriers. Excludes benefits paid directly by insurance
f I" - r [ T
As Percentave of Total
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the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, as well as the cost
associated with funding the pension, both of which are incurred only for
defined benefit plans.167
Another factor contributing to the demise of defined benefit plans was
a change in the tax law in 1987.168 In that year, Congress capped at
$150,000 the amount of annual compensation that can be taken into
account for the purposes of calculating contributions or benefits in a
qualified plan.169  Congress also placed a limit of $125,000 on the
maximum annual payout from a defined benefit plan for a retired
employee. 7 ° While such an annual pension benefit would be a luxury
for most, it clearly would represent a substantial "hardship" for retiring
executives used to annual compensation in excess of one million
dollars.17 ' Some have argued that this limitation on the generosity of
executive pensions led top management to sour on defined benefit plans
for all employees. 7 2  Because the top brass no longer saw defined
benefit plans as meaningful engines for the generation of their own
retirement income, they lost much of their motivation to be generous to
the rank and file.
173
B. Unsophisticated Investors Are Overmatched in the Financial
Services Marketplace
When financial services providers and the financial advisors they
employ contemplate the pool of retirement assets available in the defined
contribution market, they see dollar signs. As of June 30, 2003, the
entire retirement investment market in the United States was estimated
to be $10.6 trillion.'74 Of this total, approximately $4.2 trillion, or
forty percent, was in defined benefit plans. 175 Another $3.5 trillion, or
thirty-three percent, was in defined contribution plans, and the
remaining twenty-seven percent, or $2.86 trillion, was placed in
Individual Retirement Accounts independent of any employment-based
retirement plan.7 6  Recall now the one percent profit margin to be
167. Id.
168. I.R.C. § 4980A(c)(1) (1987).
169. See Mike Clowes, Why Capping Pensions Hurts All Workers, PENSIONS &
INvEsTMENTS, Nov. 25, 1996, at 10.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. DC Plan Assets Climb 7% to $3.4 Trillion at Mid-Year, DC PLAN INVESTING, June
10, 2003, at 1, 2.
175. Id. at 2.
176. Id.
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earned each year on every dollar of variable annuities assets under
management in the context of a potential pool of $3.5 trillion in defined
contribution assets.'77 This prize drove the sales and marketing
strategies of insurers and led them to push variable annuities even when
the variable annuities are not the most appropriate investment choice
for the customer.
Whereas investments in stocks and bonds were once mainly the
exclusive province of the well-to-do, by the 1980s a huge new class of
investors had entered the field of stock market investing.78  An
important tool for this class was the mutual fund, a device which offered
the investor access to the higher returns of the equities markets, with
the mitigating influence of diversification and the delegation to a
centralized agent of the task of making particular investment decisions.
Having learned to rely on Fidelity and Vanguard to invest their money
and make it grow over a period of years, investors solved a large part of
the problem of providing for their retirements. But as workers begin to
approach retirement age, there comes a time when asset growth ceases
to be the focus of a retirement investment plan and the emphasis shifts
to income generation and the managing of tax consequences.
To respond to this need, financial services corporations stepped in to
offer comprehensive services that seemed to offer the entire package.'79
The alluring promise of the variable annuity purveyor is "Give us your
money, choose from a menu of investment approaches keyed to your
particular attitude toward risk, and we'll take care of everything from
there." This appealing offer, as we have seen, has proven to be fraught
with traps.
Investors have good reason to rely on the expertise and services
offered by financial advisors, and those advisors and the companies they
represent have a right to make a profit on their products and services.
Moreover, the concept behind the design of a variable annuity is
compelling. If people want to pay a premium for the comfort of a
guaranteed lifetime income and tax-deferred earnings, then they should
be able to choose to do so. The problem is that investors have not been
given enough of an explanation to recognize that there is another way
of achieving these two goals while keeping more of their money. The
unsophisticated purchaser does not realize that the same delightful
177. See supra, Part H.
178. See James A. Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision
and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105 (1998).
179. See Donald Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627, 682-83 (1996).
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combination can be achieved by unbundling the two features: Invest in
a mutual fund and, if you wish, buy an annuity when you retire. This
is substantially cheaper and accomplishes the same financial result
while providing additional flexibility and liquidity. The question
becomes, should the seller have a duty to disclose that there are cheaper
ways to arrive at the same result? The answer is unequivocally yes.
IV. A MULTIFACETED RESPONSE TO ANNUITIES SALES PRACTICES
Beginning in early 1998, reporters in the financial press began to call
attention to the problem of annuities being sold into qualified plans.
Forbes Magazine devoted an entire cover to a story entitled, "The Great
Annuity Rip-Off." 8 The cover depicted a salesman covering a custo-
mer's eyes while motioning him to sign on the dotted line.' 8' In very
large type, the cover exclaimed: "Don't be a sucker! Variable annuities
are a lousy investment."'82 The Wall Street Journal soon followed suit,
though in somewhat more muted tones.'8' All of the reporting reached
the same conclusion: Life insurance companies were picking the pockets
of investors by selling them completely inappropriate products that the
investors would never have purchased if they really understood all the
complicated issues implicated in their investment decision."M Spurred
into action by the revelations in the press, the plaintiffs' bar took on the
case later in the year, filing the class actions discussed earlier.8 5
While journalists were attempting to arm the public with information
and plaintiffs' attorneys were trying to obtain remedies in the courts,
regulatory and self-regulatory agencies were also on the job. Both the
SEC and the NASD investigated the annuities industry and concluded
that there was, indeed, a problem.
A. The Response of the NASD
The NASD responded fairly aggressively toward annuities sellers. In
fact, the NASD was actually ahead of the plaintiffs' firms in sensing that
something was amiss. In June 1997, a full year before the first class
180. See Geer, supra note 133. It appears as though the NASD may have been on the
case six months before the Geer article. The NASD was investigating variable annuities
sellers, but the nature of the investigation was not entirely clear. See infra Part IV-A and
notes 186-88.
181. FORBES, Vol. 161, No. 3 (Feb. 9, 1998).
182. Id.
183. David Franecki, Caution Is Urged on Annuities and IRAs, WALL ST. J., July 20,
1998, at C20
184. See, e.g., Geer, supra note 133.
185. See supra Part II and notes 143-46.
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action complaints were filed, the NASD was already focusing on this
problem.'86 Speaking at a compliance conference sponsored by the
National Association for Variable Annuities in Washington, Roger B.
Sherman, the vice president of NASD Regulation, Inc. (NASDR),
revealed that the NASDR was investigating improper annuities sales
practices.'87  Conveying the NASDR's concerns to the .conference
participants, he asked, "i]s the tax deferral aspect of a policy balanced
against a presentation of high fees plus the time for the tax-deferred
aspect to outweigh the high fees? . .. Are you analyzing? . . . Did the
investment benefit the customer or the registered representative?"'
The NASD issued a Notice to Members in 1999 gently prodding the
insurance industry to curtail the practices alleged in the class ac-
tions.8 9 In the Notice, the NASD informed insurance companies and
their representatives of the measures to be taken when recommending
the purchase of variable annuities with moneys placed in qualified
plans."9 Summing up the problem, the NASD pointed out that while
variable annuities in qualified plans "provide most of the same benefits
to investors as variable annuities offered outside of a tax-qualified
retirement plan, they do not provide any additional tax deferred
treatment of earnings beyond the treatment provided by the tax-
qualified retirement plan itself."' 9' The NASD concluded that, when
recommending such an investment, the representative "should disclose
to the customer that the tax deferred accrual feature is provided by the
tax-qualified retirement plan and that the tax deferred accrual feature
of the variable annuity is unnecessary." '9 2  Further constraining
annuities sellers, the Notice instructed them to recommend variable
annuities in qualified plans only when the other features of variable
annuities-mainly the guaranteed death benefit-justify the recommen-
dation. 1
93
In addition to the Notice, the NASD took disciplinary action against
several insurers.' In December 2002 the NASD fined American
186. NASDR Focuses on Internal Supervision, INS. REGULATOR, July 7, 1997, at 1.
187. Id.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. See NASD Notice to Members 99-35, The NASD Reminds Members of their
Responsibilities Regarding the Sales of Variable Annunities, 229 (May 1999) [hereinafter
NASD Notice to Members 99-351.
190. Id. at 230-32.
191. Id. at 231.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Jeffrey S. Puretz & Nicole Griffin, NASD Turning up the Pressure on VA
Suitability, LIFE & HEALTHI/FIN. SERVICES EDITION, Apr. 7, 2003, at 36; Jeff Benjamin &
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Express Financial Advisors $350,000, citing defects in its sales, training,
and marketing practices involving variable annuities in qualified plans,
and noting that the proper role of sales agents was to explain and not
just disclose the fees, charges, and commissions that variable annuities
carry. 9 ' In what was probably the most explicit and enlightened
rebuke to date by a regulatory or self-regulatory body, the NASD noted
that American Express representatives "failed to compare and contrast
variable annuities with mutual fumds in those instances where the
customer's needs might have been better met through the purchase of
mutual funds."' This disciplinary action embodied one of the most
important aspects of the claims in the class action complaints. Central
to the plaintiffs' theory was the notion that if investors had been aware
of and understood all the facts, the investors would have purchased
mutual funds and preserved an option to annuitize later. 97 Specifical-
ly, had the investors been shown a comparison of all the costs associated
with a variable annuity alongside those levied for mutual funds, they
would have been appropriately informed and would have chosen to
purchase mutual funds.19 8 But because of the high commissions
earned by salesmen and the high profit margins reaped by their
corporate principals, annuities were pushed unreasonably while
information, analysis, and explanation was not forthcoming.'9 9
B. The Response of the SEC
While the NASD was issuing its Notice to the annuities industry itself,
the SEC's response to the variable annuities litigation came in a
Rick Miller, Short Interests: Amex Fined for Suitability Infractions, INVESTMENT NEWS,
December 9, 2002, at 2 (noting that in 2001, NASD fined two firms a total of $142,500 and
six other firms a total of $112,000).
195. Press Release, NASD, NASD Fines American Express Financial Advisors $350,000
for Improper Sales of Variable Annuities and Life Insurance, (December 4, 2002)
[hereinafter NASD Press Release].
196. Id.
197. See AMEX Complaint, supra note 143, at 15 ("the price of tax-deferral is the very
substantial, and often exorbitant, fees charged by the sellers of deferred annuities-fees
that substantially exceed the fees charged for similar non-annuity investment products like
mutual funds"); AMEX Complaint, supra note 143, at 17 ("If a customer is seeking an
annuity feature (i.e. fixed payments for life) for retirement, an immediate annuity can
invariably be purchased at the time the investment is withdrawn at the end of the
investment period (for example, upon retirement").
198. AMEX Complaint, supra note 143, at 36 (claiming that had plaintiffs been
"informed of the true nature of the investment before it was made-insurance features,
high fees, and loss of liquidity in exchange for unnecessary tax deferral-they would not
have purchased the deferred annuities."). AMEX Complaint, supra note 143.
199. See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
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warning to the investing public about the pitfalls of purchasing variable
annuities.200 In an investor alert published on the SEC's website, the
SEC highlighted the familiar problems with variable annuities in
qualified plans. 0 1 This thorough and highly readable0 2 explanation
of variable annuities revealed to consumers in no uncertain terms, and
with the use of conspicuous typographical cues, the information that
sellers of annuities should have been explaining all along.0 s Early in
the Alert, the reader's attention is drawn to the high costs involved in
purchasing a variable annuity.0 4 Then comes the key point: Set off
from the rest of the text is a large box with the word "Caution!" in bold
at the top, followed by:
Other investment vehicles, such as IRAs and employer-sponsored
401(k) plans, also may provide you with tax-deferred growth and other
tax advantages .... In addition, if you are investing in a variable
annuity through a tax-advantaged retirement plan (such as a 401(k)
plan or IRA), you will get no additional tax advantage from the
variable annuity. Under these circumstances, consider buying a
variable annuity only if it makes sense because of the annuity's other
features, such as lifetime income payments and death benefit protec-
tion.20 5
While this statement from the SEC was a promising signal about its
intent to deal with a serious problem, the statement did not carry much
weight as a disciplinary response. For one thing, this communiqud, by
its very nature, was only a public disclosure. It did not impose any
constraints on the sellers of annuities and did not carry the force of law.
Indeed, even as a disclosure, it was only effective to the extent that
investors actually read it. One wonders how many investors would find
their way to the part of the SEC website where this Alert is posted. For
that matter, a substantial percentage of the public probably does not
even know what the SEC is, so the reach of this apparently well
meaning gesture seems quite limited.
Moreover, apart from its infirmity as a "soft" expression of public
policy, the SEC Alert is deficient on its face. By focusing investors'
200. SEC Investor Alert-Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, available at
httpJ/www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm (last visited Nov. 13,2003) [hereinafter SEC
Investor Alert].
201. Id.
202. In this case, at least, the SEC has heeded its own mandates regarding the use of
plain English in securities-related documents intended for public consumption.
203. SEC Investor Alert, supra note 200.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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attention only on the problem of duplication of tax deferral and
encouraging investors to purchase variable annuities on the basis of a
desire for guaranteed retirement income, the Alert arguably does more
harm than good.20 ' An investor who has read this advice would
believe that the government agency responsible for investor protection
and education endorses the purchase of variable annuities with qualified
plan moneys on the basis of the annuitization function alone. This is
patently bad advice. The two-phase nature of a variable annuity
requires an investor to invest money today in order to annuitize
tomorrow. This requirement reduces investor liquidity by locking the
funds into an investment vehicle that imposes surrender charges for
early withdrawal. The more appropriate course of action for an investor
seeking lifetime payments is to invest today in less expensive securities,
like mutual funds, and purchase an immediate annuity when the
investor is ready to turn capital into a regular and lifelong stream of
207income.
By the end of 1999, there seemed to be a reasonable basis to believe
that the annuities affair was headed toward a positive resolution. The
NASD had been investigating and disciplining. Both the NASD and
SEC had alerted the public about the problem, so perhaps investors
understood the issues and would not be fooled again. The companies
themselves had been chastened, or at least frightened, by the class
actions. And, whether the companies signed a settlement agreement or
merely took the misfortunes of their industry compatriots as a caution-
ary tale, the companies ought to have cleaned up their acts. 0" They
had also learned that the press and the plaintiffs' bar were watching
vigilantly for any misstep. Several cases were still working their way
through the courts with a fair expectation of success. Taken together,
these developments seemed encouraging. But any real optimism about
the future good behavior of the insurance industry would have been
misplaced.
C. The Annuities Cases in the Courts
While the NASD and SEC responded to the litigation (and earlier class
actions alleging fraudulent sales of life insurance)2 9 by reaffirming the
206. The most recent NASD pronouncement on the problem also suffers from this
infirmity. See NASD Press Release, supra note 195 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Carolyn T. Geer, Finally, a Warning About Annuities, FORTUNE, July 5,
1999, at 212 (explaining that the subsidiary benefits of variable annuities rarely justify
purchasing one for a qualified plan). See also AMEX Complaint, supra note 143, at 17.
208. See infra text accompanying note 263.
209. See supra Parts IV-A and IV-B.
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importance of consumer protection and acknowledging the vulnerability
of unsophisticated consumers in the hands of brokers and dealers,21 °
Congress took a much different track, passing the Uniform Standards
Act to fortify and extend the reach of the Reform Act.21' As we have
seen, under the Uniform Standards Act, actions alleging fraud in the
sale of "covered securities" must be brought in federal court under
federal law. 212  In 2000 when the federal courts began finding that
variable annuities fell under the Uniform Standards Act's definition of
"covered securities,"213 the curtain dropped on the variable annuities
litigation before it ever got a proper audience.
The first fatal blow to the annuities class actions came in 2000 in
Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Insurance Co.214 The Lander action
was filed as a class action in a Connecticut state court in 1998.
Plaintiffs' allegations were similar to those of the SunAmerica and
Nationwide plaintiffs. The causes of action pleaded were all based on
Connecticut state law. 21 ' Hartford Life removed the case to federal
court, citing the Uniform Standards Act, which requires removal of "'any
covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered
security.'"2"6 In an unpublished decision, the district court dismissed
the case, and plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.1 7
Although it declined to discuss the merits of the suit, the circuit court
did state that "if funds set aside through a tax deferred investment
vehicle, such as a 401(k) plan or IRA account, are used to purchase a
variable annuity contract, the policyholder will receive no additional tax
benefit. This tax redundancy forms the basis for the plaintiffs' suit."21 '
210. See NASD Notice to Members 99-35, supra note 189; SEC Investor Alert, supra
note 200.
211. See supra Part I.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 251 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001).
215. Id. at 105-06, 109-10.
216. Id. at 106 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2001)).
217. Id. at 107.
218. Id. at 106. I quote this material simply because it highlights the paucity of any
judicial pronouncements in this largely confidential dispute; it is one of the only instances
of the class allegations appearing in any federal reporter. The only other discussions of
class allegations appear in the other cases dismissing the state claims on identical SLUSA
preemption grounds. See, e.g., Herndon v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 02CV73, 2002 WL
320066806 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2002), afld, 325 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2003); Patenaude v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 290 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2002); Dudek
v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 295 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2002); Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co.,
206 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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The court proceeded to address the crucial question of whether a
variable annuity was a "covered security" as defined in the Uniform
Standards Act.219 Under the Uniform Standards Act, "a 'security is a
covered security if [it] is issued by an investment company that is
registered, or that has filed a registration statement, under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.
'
"220
The court held that a variable annuity was a "covered security" under
the Uniform Standards Act by referring to the U.S. Supreme Court's
1959 ruling221 in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of
America ("VALIC). 222 In VALIC the Supreme Court held that even
though variable annuities are a kind of hybrid investment product (part
insurance, part security), they must be registered as securities under the
Securities Act of 1933,223 and issuers must comply with the Investment
Company Act of 1940.2' The court in Lander concluded that variable
annuities must therefore be covered securities under the Uniform
Standards Act and that removal was proper.2 2 ' Further, because no
federal causes of action were pleaded, the Uniform Standards Act
required dismissal of the case.226
In dismissing the case, the Second Circuit tolled the death knell for
these class actions. In federal circuit after federal circuit, the courts
have uniformly dismissed annuities cases under the Uniform Standards
Act.227 The practical upshot of the Uniform Standards Act cases was
the end of the variable annuities litigation. Plaintiffs are foreclosed from
petitioning state courts for any remedy arising from the purchase or sale
of variable annuities. Plaintiffs may continue to bring state law claims
in federal court on an individual basis, but neither state court actions
nor federal class actions based on state statutory or common law are
219. Lander, 251 F.3d at 108-09.
220. Id. at 109 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2)). See also Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -b-21 (2000). Although insurance companies are not investment
companies under the Investment Company Act, the variable annuities they sell must
contain separate investment accounts that must be registered with the SEC pursuant to
the 1940 Act. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
221. Lander, 251 F.3d at 109.
222. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
223. VALIC, 359 U.S. at 66; 15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb.
224. VALIC, 359 U.S. at 70-72.
225. Lander, 251 F.3d at 109.
226. Id. at 110. The heightened pleading requirements and discovery stay imposed by
the Reform Act evidently led plaintiffs to decide that pleading federal causes of action
would pose insurmountable informational hurdles. See supra Part I.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 217-18.
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permitted.228 As a result, the aggregative force of Rule 23 litigation
has been undermined, and the search for a judicial remedy for these
insurance industry wrongdoings evaporated. In the end, legislation that
was touted for its salutary effects on corporate disclosure succeeded in
undermining a common law process that was working effectively toward
redressing wrongs caused by defective disclosure.
D. What the Courts Might Have Done Had the Cases Not Been
Dismissed
Had the Uniform Standards Act not operated to terminate the claims
of annuities plaintiffs, then the courts would not have had to look far to
find a basis for finding that the defendants' disclosures were inadequate.
If the cases had been heard on the merits, then the defendants could
have argued that they fulfilled their disclosure requirements. Because
most of the causes of action required plaintiffs to prove a material
misstatement or omission, the defendants would have been quick to
demonstrate that they had fully disclosed the nature of their products
and all of the fees and charges involved. But as the NASD understood,
in these types of transactions, more than simple revelation of the
features of the product should be required.22 9 A heightened duty of
disclosure, akin to that of a fiduciary, should have been imposed. Indeed
it does not seem far fetched to believe that the courts would have done
so.
1. The Fiduciary Duty of Financial Advisors and Others Who
Sell Variable Annuities. The role of the fiduciary is long established
in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The law of fiduciaries creates and
orders, in various circumstances, important statuses and relationships
between actors in society. Familiar examples abound: Members of
partnerships owe each other fiduciary duties, 23 ' and corporate directors
owe fiduciary duties to shareholders.231 Trustees, bailees, and guard-
ians are among the most ancient classes of fiduciaries, with the roots of
their statuses stretching as far back as Roman Law.
But if the law of fiduciaries is an ancient story, it also has a modern
chapter. In the twentieth century, the label "fiduciary" has been affixed
to a growing number of public actors, such as physicians and psychia-
trists, as well as union leaders who represent their members in dealings
228. Lander, 251 F.3d at 113.
229. See Puretz & Griffen, supra note 194.
230. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547-48 (N.Y. App. 1928).
231. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (1985).
722 [Vol. 55
HeinOnline  -- 55 Mercer L. Rev. 722 2003-2004
VARIABLE ANNUITIES
with management.2 32 Banks act as fiduciaries with respect to the
funds their customers deposit, and in some circumstances, majority
shareholders of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to minority sharehold-
ers.
2 33
In the field of financial services, the question of whether financial
advisors are fiduciaries yields a complicated answer. Plan administra-
tors are considered fiduciaries under ERISA,23 4 as well as under state
and federal common law.235 The fiduciary status of stockbrokers, on
the other hand, occupies a somewhat murkier realm.
The relationships of individual investors with their brokers vary
greatly. At one end of the spectrum, when a customer employs a broker
at a retail investment firm, such as Charles Schwab, Inc., merely to
execute transactions in securities that the customer has designed, the
broker clearly is not acting as a fiduciary, except in the execution of the
transaction.23 6 At the other end, a wealthy investor frequently en-
trusts his broker with a well-funded account that includes cash and
securities. The wealthy investor deploys the broker as his agent to
manage the account as the broker sees fit. In such cases the customer
relies on the broker's experience and expertise to manage the "discretion-
ary account." Just as the previous example typifies the clear-cut case of
a non-fiduciary, the broker managing a discretionary account represents
the paradigmatic case of broker-as-fiduciary. In managing a discretion-
ary account, a broker is often responsible for deciding how a client's
assets will be allocated. Many asset allocation decisions are made
independently by the broker who confers with his client with varying
frequency, depending on the relationship.
Whatever the details of the relationship, the broker, as a fiduciary,
owes his client a duty to act "with the utmost good faith."237 The scope
of this duty in various situations is not always clear, but the general
principle remains: The fiduciary is to act in the client's best interests
and is not to pursue his own interests.
232. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 795, 796.
233. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 306 (1939); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162
F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947).
234. See infra Part IV-D-2 and text accompanying notes 243-47.
235. Miller v. Lay Trucking Co., 606 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
236. See, e.g., Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
107, 111 (N.D. Ala. 1971) ("The (fiduciary] relationship of agent and principal only existed
between [broker and customer] when an order to buy or sell was placed, and terminated
when the transaction was complete.").
237. See Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222,236 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968) ("The relationship between broker and principal is fiduciary in nature and
imposes on the broker the duty of acting in the highest good faith toward the principal.").
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Between these two ends of the spectrum are many legal theories
governing the existence of a fiduciary duty.2 8 Even when there is no
238. For an excellent survey of the varying legal approaches to the question, see Carol
R. Goforth, Stockbrokers'Duties to Their Customers, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 407, 418-31. A
summary of Goforth's exposition follows. A minority view holds that a stockbroker always
owes a fiduciary duty to the customer. Id. at 418-20; see, e.g., Marchese v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1984); Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 668
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
A related approach embraces the law of agency, reasoning that the broker, as an agent,
owes a fiduciary duty. Goforth, supra, at 420. For example, the Supreme Court of Arizona
has stated that "there is no quarrel with the proposition of law that when a broker serves
as a customer's agent, he is a fiduciary and owes his principal a duty to communicate
certain information to him." Walston & Co. v. Miller, 410 P.2d 658, 660 (Ariz. 1966) (en
banc) (emphasis added); see also Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160
(Ct. App. 1968) (explaining that a "stockbroker owes [a fiduciary] duty to his customers,
whom he ordinarily serves as agent.").
Still other courts emphasize the existence or absence of a discretionary account, finding
a fiduciary duty only in the former case. Goforth, supra, at 422-25; Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1978); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Boech, 377 N.W.2d 504 (Wis. 1985). Some courts take a more impressionistic and
fact-specific approach to determine whether the broker is acting with the trust and
confidence of the client. Goforth, supra, 425-27. Under this approach, fiduciary
relationships "frequently arise out of trust and confidence consensually placed in the
superior knowledge, skill or judgment of another." Steinbrugge v. Haddock, 281 F.2d 871,
874 (10th Cir. 1960). While this method of determining the existence of fiduciary duties
seems to cast a wide net over many interactions between clients and brokers, courts have
been careful to balance the breadth of the inquiry with a limitation on the ability of clients
to rely willy-nilly on the broker's expertise. In this connection note the restrictive language
in Walston, the Arizona case cited above, which should be read alongside the following
quotation from that case: "As a general proposition, a broker's duty is complete, and his
authority ceases, when the sale is made and the receipts therefrom fully accounted for.").
Walston, 410 P.2d at 661 (quoting Pacific Trading Co. v. Sun Ins. Office, 13 P.2d 616 (Or.
1932). See also Steinbrugge, 281 F.2d at 874
(we do not think the courts have ever gone so far as to allow one person to rely
with impunity upon the superior business judgment of another, merely because
he so chooses, and thus raise an enforceable fiducial relationship. He cannot
blindly follow the counsel of the other party simply because it is superior.).
Similarly fact sensitive is the "control test" employed by some courts. Goforth, supra,
at 427-29; see Leboce, S.A. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 709 F.2d 605
(9th Cir. 1983); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986).
Using the "control test," courts have asked whether investors have "for all practical
purposes relinquish[ed] control over their investment decisions to their brokers and place
their confidence in their brokers' superior knowledge and level of experience. At the same
time, we recognize that brokers should not be the insurers of their customers' accounts."
Adams, 718 P.2d at 517. The multifarious factual inquiry includes factors such as the
broker's past activities as investment advisor, the extent to which the customer followed
the broker's advice, the extent to which the broker trades without the customer's prior
approval, the frequency of communications between the broker and customer, the
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discretionary account, courts have held that a fiduciary duty exists if the
broker is found to control the client's account. Sometimes courts use
evidentiary presumptions to shift the burden of proving or disproving the
existence of a fiduciary relationship to one party or the other.
Yet another approach is the "shingle theory," under which an
investment professional who "holds [himself] out" as a "financial advisor"
or "financial planner" is deemed to have made an "implied representa-
tion that he will deal fairly with [his] customers."2 39 The shingle
theory has been adopted by statute in some states in consumer
protection legislation, which confers the status of a fiduciary upon
financial planners or financial advisors who advertise themselves as
such.24 From a choice of law perspective, this legislative reality has
guided plaintiffs' attorneys in their choice of forum for filing some
annuities class actions.2 4' Of course, since Lander, this forum shop-
ping aspect has, as a practical matter, become moot.2 42
2. The ERISA Analogy: Financial Advisors Are Akin to ERISA
Plan Administrators. Private stock brokers and investment advisors
are not the only source of investment advice. Many people, in their
capacities as employees, benefit from the financial advice of their
employers' plan administrators.2 4  Plan administrators are financial
investment sophistication of the customer, and the degree of trust and confidence reposed
in the broker. Id.
Probably the most stringent test adopted by some courts is the "special agreement test."
Under this test, a fiduciary duty will not be imposed absent some evidence of an agreement
between the broker and customer regarding the level of care owed by the broker. Goforth,
supra, at 430-32; McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 736 F.2d 1254
(8th Cir. 1984) ("Absent a special agreement to the contrary, a licensed broker owes his
customer only the duty to exercise due care in executing all instructions expressly given
to him by the principal.") Id. at 1258 (quoting Rude v. Larson, 207 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn.
1973) (per curiam)).
239. Langevoort, supra note 179, at 680.
240. 2002 MINN. STAT. § 45.026 (2002) ("Persons who represent that they are financial
planners have a fiduciary duty to persons for whom services are performed for compensa-
tion."). NEV. REV. STAT. 628A.010 (2003) (defining financial planner as one "who holds
himself out as qualified to" advise on "investment of money or... provision of income to
be needed in the future"); NEV. REV. STAT. 628A.020 (2003) ("A financial planner has the
duty of a fiduciary toward a client.").
241. For example, the AMEX class action was filed in Minnesota, which, in addition to
being the domicile state of one defendant (IDS Life Insurance Company, a subsidiary of
American Express), was a state that had adopted "shingle theory" legislation for the
protection of consumers. 2002 MINN. STAT. § 45.026.
242. Lander, 251 F.3d at 110.
243. Under ERISA, an employee benefit plan and pension plan is defined as:
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professionals who are responsible for the management and administra-
tion of employee benefit plans, including pension plans and related
investment vehicles. 2" Under ERISA plan administrators are fiducia-
ries charged with providing employees with information they need to
understand their options and to make effective decisions.2" The duties
of a fiduciary under ERISA are modeled on fiduciary duties in the law
of trusts.2" According to the United States Supreme Court, "ERISA
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law... ERISA's
legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility
provisions ... 'codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries
certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.'"
2 47
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts,2" in setting out a trustee's duty
to furnish information, states that a trustee has "a duty to communicate
to the beneficiary all material facts in connection with the transaction
which the trustee knows or should know."2 49 The Restatement further
provides that the trustee must "communicate to the beneficiary material
facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such
plan, fund, or program-(i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results
in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of
covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the
contribution made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the
plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994).
244. Plan administrators may be employees working on site at the firm or organization
or may be an outside consultant employed as an agent by multiple firms.
245. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). Under ERISA:
a person is a fiduciary with respect to [an employee benefit] plan to the extent (i)
he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or ... disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect
to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibili-
ty to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibili-
ty in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
246. See, e.g., Lorraine A. Schmall, Telling The Truth About Golden Handshakes: Exit
Incentives and Fiduciary Duties, 5 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POLY J. 169; Maria Hylton &
Lorraine Schmall, Employee Benefits 318-20 (1998); Ryan P. Barry, Comment, ERISA's
Purpose: The Conveyance of Information from Trustee to Beneficiary, 31 CONN. L. REV. 735,
746 (1999).
247. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 93-533, at 11 (1973)).
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173.
249. Id. comment d.
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beneficiary does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for
his protection in dealing with a third person with respect to his
interest."
250
By enacting ERISA, Congress codified the standards embodied in the
law of trusts, requiring in section 1104 that:
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and- (A) for the
exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries... (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims."
In addition ERISA mandates that a fiduciary shall not "in his
individual or any other capacity act in any transaction involving the
plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are
adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or
beneficiaries."252 As is the case in any situation involving a fiduciary,
the real question is fact based: What is the content of the fiduciary duty?
What must the advisor do in his capacity as fiduciary?253
3. What the Fiduciary Duty Ought to Require. In the case of an
employee asking whether he should invest his 401(k) money in a
variable annuity, a plan administrator fulfilling his fiduciary duty would
be obliged to inform the employee that an option to place his 401(k)
money into a variable annuity is probably not a good choice. At a
minimum, the plan administrator, understanding the requirement to
communicate the information required for the employee to make the best
decision, must explain that there is no additional value to be gained
from a second layer of tax deferral (it's overlapping, not serial). The
plan administrator would also have to explain that the functional
equivalent would be to invest in mutual funds and then, if desired,
purchase an immediate annuity upon retirement. Noting that these two
approaches are not one hundred percent congruous, the advisor should
go on to explain the additional characteristics of variable annuities, fully
250. Id.
251. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000).
252. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2) (2000).
253. The familiar refrain that a finding of a fiduciary duty is only the beginning of the
inquiry applies here. Of course, there is no universally applicable description of the actual
content of the duty; it differs depending on the circumstances of the relationship.
Shibboleths such as "duty of utmost care" and "something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace" only provide a framework for examining the facts of a particular transaction.
7272004]
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educating the beneficiary about the guaranteed death benefit and its
potential value or lack thereof. To fully discharge his duties, the advisor
would also explain that the annual fees and charges, as well as any
surrender charges, would eat into the value of the investment, eroding
the funds in the account year by year.
Financial advisors and others licensed to sell variable annuities ought
to be held to a heightened duty of disclosure, akin to the duty of a
fiduciary. The industry standard on the disclosure required is insuffi-
cient in that it is based upon revelation, and not explanation of
information.2M It is not enough to say that the agent has fully
explained the product and disclosed the fees, charges, and commissions.
Rather, the purveyors of annuities should be required to explain to
buyers that the retirement planning objectives accomplished by a
variable annuity can be achieved by purchasing mutual funds today and
immediate annuities upon retirement. Further, agents must offer a
comparison of the expenses associated with variable annuities versus
those associated with mutual funds and immediate annuities. Such a
comparison would require agents to prepare comparative illustrations
showing how the costs will eat into the account balances from year to
year. Only then will investors planning for retirement be sufficiently
informed to make the decision that is in their best interests: whether the
death benefit is worthwhile, whether the loss of liquidity is a meaningful
detriment, or whether the simplicity of one-stop shopping is worth the
costs involved. If the answer to these questions is yes, then the insurers
and their agents will turn a handsome profit for the benefit they confer.
If not, the insurers and agents can make an appropriate profit on the
sale of a more suitable investment product.
Scrupulous industry actors, from the highest executive levels all the
way to street-level financial planners, recognize that the mainstream
variable annuity inside a qualified plan is a bad deal. Indeed the
president of Nationwide Financial Services Inc. has noted that "there are
abuses.... I think in the future you'll find that some companies are
going to have problems based on the way they sold these variable
annuities."255 Inflated sales commissions for variable annuities (up to
seven percent, often more than twice the commission for sales of mutual
funds) are among the concerns that make many principled financial
advisors uncomfortable.2"6  One accountant and financial planner
confessed that variable annuities are a specialized product not appropri-
254. See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text.
255. Bridget O'Brian, Annuities Watch: Annuities Industry Attempts to Shake Its Bad-
Dog Image, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at C1.
256. Id.
[Vol. 55728
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257ate for the masses.  As Lou Barberini, a San Francisco accountant
and financial planner noted, "[i]t's a niche product, for someone with a
lot of income .... That's the only market I really see for it .... The
commission is so camouflaged that it's not apparent to people .... I've
never found anyone it really works for."
28
But most annuities sold into qualified plans result from aggressive
selling tactics. "I don't know anybody who would say it's good to have
a variable annuity inside a qualified plan, other than the people that sell
them,"259 said one New York-based insurance consultant whose
compensation is fee based, rather than commission driven. Variable
annuities are mainly "for unsophisticated people who are talked into
things by insurance agents and by brokers and by banks."260
The practices of the most conscientious annuities companies are
instructive. The market conduct of TIAA-CREF highlights what is
wrong with the practices of the mainstream life insurers. TIAA-CREF
sells more variable annuities than any other firm, and almost all of them
go into qualified plans. As an organization that sells variable annuities
on a non-profit basis, TIAA-CREF's fee structure26 reveals that the
fees charged by most other insurers are not necessary to defray the cost
of the death benefit guarantee, as some have claimed in defense of the
insurance industry.26
2
Were it not for the Uniform Standards Act's preemption of the
annuities cases, the courts would have had an opportunity to address a
fraudulent commercial practice about which there was substantial
consensus by knowledgeable professionals. In view of the expansion of
fiduciary law in recent decades and changes in retirement investment
needs of average Americans, it seems likely that the courts would have
been sympathetic to those claims.
V. EPILOGUE: CONTINUING SHENANIGANS
One need not look far for reasons to be suspicious of the behavior of
insurance companies in the marketplace. The public image of insurance
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Franecki, supra note 183, at C20 (quoting insurance consultant Glenn Daily).
260. David Franecki, For Annuities, Past Quarter Brought Assaults on the Industry's
Image, Fees and Tax Status, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1998, at R28 (quoting insurance
consultant Glenn Daily).
261. See Milevsky & Posner, supra note 122.
262. See Norse N. Blazzard & Judith A. Hasenauer, Annuities Are Good for Tax-
Qualified Retirement Plans, NATL UNDERWRITER, LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVICES EDITION,
Apr. 7, 2003, at 14 (arguing in favor of industry practices).
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companies has been bruised by a history of behavior that is, to put it
kindly, hard for the public to swallow. Of course, most people recognize
the existential conflict insurance companies face. To maximize their
profits, they must aggressively induce consumers to purchase policies
that will provide benefits in case of certain contingencies and then
restrict the payment of benefits when the contingencies occur.26 This
unfortunate reality is widely understood and is not the subject of this
Article.
Nevertheless, the annuities class actions arose just as an earlier round
of class actions against the insurance industry was winding up. These
"market conduct" cases concerned some pretty egregious behavior by
insurers.'" Chief among the frauds in these suits were churning
practices, in which agents directed customers to move funds from one
policy to another for no apparent reason other than the additional
263. In the wake of an earlier round of class action litigation against the insurance
industry for fraudulent sales and marketing practices, the industry established a watchdog
organization to create guidelines for insurers to help them maintain ethical standards. For
a fee, insurers undergo a review of the procedures and policies they have in place regarding
training and sales and marketing in the life insurance trade. The Insurance Marketplace
Standards Association (IMSA), launched in November 1996, established six Principles of
Ethical Market Conduct: (1) to do business according to high standards of honesty and
fairness; (2) to provide competent and customer-focused sales and service; (3) to engage in
active and fair competition; (4) to provide advertising and sales materials that are clear,
honest and fair; (5) to provide fair and expeditious handling of customer complaints and
disputes; and (6) to maintain a system of supervision designed to achieve compliance with
these principles. Companies that successfully complete the ethics review receive an IMSA
seal of approval with which they can certify their clean hands to the investing public. See
US Watchdog Follows Sales Scandals, LIFE INS. INTL, Oct. 1996, at 6. It is interesting to
note that the IMSA regime is limited to the sales and marketing of annuities and
individual life products and was not designed to apply to other contentious areas of the
insurance business such as underwriting and payment of claims. See Carole King, Will
IMSA's One-Size-Fits-All Approach Work? Insurance Marketing Standards Assn.'s
Certification Program for Life Insurers, NATL UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVICES
EDITION, Nov. 17, 1997, at 39. IMSA's self-description on its homepage bears this
observation: "IMSA is a voluntary membership organization leading the insurance
industry in promoting high ethical standards in the sale of individual insurance, long-term
care insurance and annuity products." (emphasis added) IMSA, http://imsaethics.org. (last
visited Jan. 14, 2001).
264. See, e.g., Linda Koco, Bring the Whole Tribe into Compliance Process, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVICES EDITION, Jan. 26, 1998, at 19 (noting that
concerns about market conduct, namely sales and marketing principles and practices "are
but a small component of the overall issue of compliance that insurance companies must
confront").
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commissions garnered by the brokers, and the "vanishing premiums"
scandal. 5
Vanishing premiums was the promise made to purchasers of variable
life insurance policies who were told they would only have to pay
premiums for a relatively short period of time. 26 6 After that time, the
investment earnings generated by the paid-in premiums would be
sufficient to pay all future premiums-the premiums would vanish.2 67
As it turned out, the premiums did not disappear and millions of policy
holders sued. These practices were costly to consumers and ultimately
to the insurers, who were forced to settle the class actions at great
expense.
Not only did these settlements involve huge dollar figures, they also
affected millions of consumers. State Farm Life Insurance agreed to a
settlement of approximately $200 million with 4.4 million policyhold-
ers.26 In 1997 Prudential Financial Services, Inc. set aside $2.6
billion to pay the claims of 1.1 million policyholders arising from its
market conduct litigation.269 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. settled its
market conduct and annuities cases for $1.7 billion, and it also paid
$109.5 million to settle with state insurance departments and a $25
million civil penalty to settle a federal investigation. John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance settled its cases for $350 million.27 '
As the vanishing premium litigation drew to a close, the annuities
actions were filed and they sometimes included other charges of
misdeeds involving "clone funds."27 2 As mentioned above, when an
investor purchases a variable annuity, he must choose how his premi-
ums will be invested during the accumulation phase. During the late
1990s, when watching the stock markets soar became a national
obsession, the highest performing mutual funds gained renown while the
fund managers who designed them reaped untold riches and an odd sort
of celebrity. With vast sums pouring into these name brand mutual
funds like Twentieth Century International Fund, life insurance
265. See Albert B. Crenshaw, MetLife Agrees to Settle Policy Suits, WASH. POST, Aug.
19, 1999, at El.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. David Shook, Fraud Suits Making Life Difficult for Insurers, THE RECORD (New
Jersey), Dec. 13, 1998, at B1.
269. Joseph B. Treaster, Variable Annuities Inquiry Is Looking into Prudential, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 31, 2003, at C2; Shook, supra note 268.
270. Treaster, supra note 269, at C2; Shook, supra note 268.
271. Shook, supra note 268.
272. David Franecki, Annuity Clones of Mutual Funds Warned, WALL ST. J., May 26,
1998, at C22.
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companies sought to attract capital by naming their own subaccounts
after the much adulated mutual funds and replicating their composi-
tion.273 But while the insurance companies were successful in inducing
consumers to put their money into these clone funds, the clone funds
frequently did not provide the returns achieved by the name brand
mutual funds. One plaintiff sued when his "TCI Growth Fund," a clone
of the Twentieth Century Growth Fund, suffered a loss of more than five
percent while its namesake grew by fifteen percent during the same
period. 4
Plaintiff in Young v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co.275 found a court
sympathetic to his claims that he had been defrauded by the insurer's
marketing of clone funds.7 In an opinion denying defendant's motion
to dismiss,277 Judge Kent of the U.S. District Court in Galveston,
Texas, wrote that the practice of giving these subaccounts similar names
gives rise to great confusion as to whether the insurance funds are
clones: "Defendants should have known that their representations of the
funds to be the 'Best of America' and their use of nearly identical
monikers, posed a danger of misleading investors."2 71 Judge Kent
continued, noting that "an inference rises that they were attempting to
associate the insurance funds with the retail funds, despite the fact that
the two in fact did not correlate, in order to capitalize on the popularity
of the well known publicly traded mutual funds with the same
name."279 While these claims never amounted to much, they are yet
another reminder that wholesale legislative initiatives to hamstring the
judicial process can leave consumers in a very vulnerable position.
Recently there have been new charges, though not well documented,
that insurance agents have been "mishandling" sales documents and
continuing to make unsuitable sales of variable annuities.2"' Indeed
273. "Clone fund" is something of a misnomer, as there are usually differences in the
composition, cash flows, and expenses of the original and the clone. These differences can
add up to a substantial disparity in performance, as in the case of the Hartford Capital
Appreciation fund which, during a twelve-month period in the late 1990's, grew by one
hundred percent, while its clone gained only forty-five percent. See Edward Wyatt, How
a Fund's Clone Can Become a Very Different Animal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at § 3, p.
8.
274. Young v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 914 (S.D. Texas 1998).
275. Id. at 919.
276. Id. at 922.
277. Id. at 930.
278. Id. at 922.
279. Id.
280. See Treaster, supra note 269 (reporting that NASD and the New York State
Insurance Department are investigating various "technical violations" in the sales of
variable annuities); NASD News Release, NASD Takes Disciplinary Action for Variable
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new deceptions are likely to be unearthed for the foreseeable future as
insurance companies tweak their product lines to remain a step ahead
of regulators and consumers. This tinkering frustrates the attempts of
the overwhelmed and underresourced state regulators who are charged
with overseeing the insurance industry.2"' Companies are able to get
around the regulators by renaming products or subtly changing their
features. For example, according to one state regulator, a company
"won't call it an equity indexed annuity, they'll call it something else and
it gets approved."282 One regulator concluded that there are "too many
situations in which promises are made with one hand and taken away
with another and we are not regulatorily equipped to deal with that...
we have to eliminate not-safe-at-any speed types of products."2"
Insurance companies and other providers of investment products will
always look for a competitive edge, staying a step ahead of consumers
and the law. And they have a substantial built-in advantage over the
consumers. Their advantage comes from the very nature of the
insurance business. Because actuarial computation lies at the heart of
the risk management process, insurance companies have the ability to
price various components of their products with great precision. Costs
and profits are measured in basis points. To the average consumer, two
or three basis points is a rounding factor, a matter of a few dollars. But
when one considers the minute precision with which insurance
companies calculate their figures, in combination with the fact that the
industry controls hundreds of billions of dollars, those little basis points
can add up to staggering amounts of money. Further, decisionmakers
within insurance firms, like all corporate executives, have substantial
personal financial stakes in the firm's profits. Therefore, the addition of
even one basis point of profit across a ten billion dollar portfolio could
amount to a substantial incentive to deceive consumers who might
contribute to those profits by investing.
The foregoing catalog of past and emerging misdeeds on the part of the
insurance industry should be sufficient to persuade anyone concerned
with consumer protection that chicanery is to be expected from insurers.
Annuity Abuses and Issues Investor Alert on Variable Products (May 27, 2003)
(announcing $125,000 fining of Florida affiliate of Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. for
mishandling investor complaints about variable annuities and announcing three other
enforcement actions against individual agents for unsuitable sales of variable annuities).
281. See Jim Connolly, Product Innovations Stun Regulators, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, LIFE
& HEALTH/FIN. SERVICEs EDITION, Dec. 15, 1997, at 6.
282. Id. (quoting Jerry Fickes, life insurance actuary with the New Mexico Department
of Insurance).
283. Id. (quoting Tom Foley, Chair of the Life & Health Actuarial (Technical) Task
Force).
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However, to those who believe that market forces and the current legal
order impose sufficient restraints, there is one bit of statistical evidence
suggesting that lawsuits, self-regulatory agency action, SEC regulatory
oversight, industry watchdog activity, and congressional reformation of
securities law have not quite put out the fire. Logic and a reasonably
optimistic view of human nature would suggest that after all the
attention paid to the sales of variable annuities in qualified plans, an
analysis of cold, hard data would reveal that companies are no longer
selling variable annuities into qualified plans. One would expect to see
a significant drop off beginning around 1999 when the class action
lawyers really sank their teeth into the matter and sent their associates
digging deeply into the confidential documents of the defendant
companies. One would hope, in any event, to find statistics on sales of
annuities into qualified plans, but such data is closely guarded by the
industry and is not normally disclosed. However, a report obtained from
the Life Insurance Market Research Association (LIMRA) tells an
interesting story. A glance at Table 3 reveals a rather alarming trend.
Inexplicably, the percentage of annuities being sold into qualified
plans has actually increased since 1998, the year the class actions were
filed and the companies were put on notice that the world was watching.
It is difficult to understand exactly why the insurance industry has not
curtailed these abusive sales practices.& Perhaps it is not farfetched
to surmise that once the federal appellate courts began dismissing the
annuities class actions on the grounds of Uniform Standards Act
preemption, the insurance companies heaved a sigh of relief and went
back to business as usual. With the percentage of variable annuities
sold into qualified plans at its highest level since overall variable
annuity sales exploded in the early 1990s, one is left with the conclusion
that the "reforms" implemented as part of the Contract with America,
284. One partial explanation for the continued high levels of qualified annuities sales
comes from the experience of TIAA-CREF. TIAA-CREF originated the variable annuity in
1951 and is the leading U.S. seller. TIAA-CREF sells a large volume of variable annuities
into qualified plans both to its members (teachers and other university employees) and to
the public. TIAA-CREF's market share in 2001 was approximately twenty-eight percent
for new variable annuities contracts. See Rick Carey, First Quarter VA Sales of $2.6 Billion
Lag Behind Last Year's Pace, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVICES EDITION,
June 10, 2002, at 23. However, as a nonprofit institution, CREF sells these products in a
consumer-friendly manner, with extremely low fees and charges. The annuities sold
directly to the public are not sold through broker-dealers and so sales commissions, a major
component of the costs that make variable annuities an unsuitable investment for qualified
plans, are not involved. Id. Nevertheless, even excluding TIAA-CREF annuities from the
industry figures, the lack of any appreciable overall drop in the percentage of all variable
annuity sales that are qualified sales indicates the dramatic drop off one would have
expected.
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TABLE 3
Year Total VA Sales (in VA Sales into Percentage of VA
billions) Qualified Plans Sales in QP
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002*
$5.29
$9.30
$12.70
$11.80
$13.50
$17.20
$21.50
$30.70
$47.00
$51.70
$49.50
$72.80
$87.90
$99.50
$121.80
$137.20
$111.00
$119.30
$4.6
$7.4
$10.3
$9.8
$10.8
$13.2
$15.9
$20.8
$26.0
$30.0
$29.3
$39.9
$48.2
$54.4
$68.0
$74.7
$61.3
$69.9
87%
80%
81%
83%
80%
77%
74%
68%
55%
58%
59%
55%
55%
55%
56%
54%
55%
59%
* Preliminary estimate
Note: Dollar figures are in billions. Qualified sales includes all types of IRAs,
403(b), 401(k), Keogh, Pension trust, and deferred compensation programs in which
money deposited qualifies for federal income tax deferral under IRS code.
Source: LIMRA International
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which were sold by Congress as a way to improve corporate disclosure,
have had quite the opposite effect in this particular instance. Insulated
by securities reform legislation from the disciplinary effect of class
actions, it seems as though life insurance companies will continue to
aggressively push retirement investors to purchase variable annuities for
their tax-qualified plans.
CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, all legislation would be drafted to efficiently address
the problems that a strong majority agrees merit attention. In this best
of all possible worlds, our elected officials frequently come up short. The
likelihood of this occurring is predictably greater when Congress rushes
into dramatic reforms, rather than pursuing incremental steps in a more
deliberate fashion. Because the Reform Act's definition of "covered
security" was not sufficiently considered, a huge class of Americans have
been locked out of court, unable to pursue a remedy for a widespread
and shameless fraud. The one-two punch of PSLRA and SLUSA ended
up being a knockout for the annuities plaintiffs.
In an era when reliance on corporate and governmental old age
assistance is increasingly in doubt, it is more important than ever that
Americans maximize their capacity to be self-sufficient in retirement.
As the baby boom generation reaches retirement age, fewer and fewer
workers will be paying benefits into an already ailing Social Security
system to fund the benefits of more and more retirees. 2 5 Apart from
the demographic trends, political momentum in Washington seems to be
steering Social Security away from its traditional paternalistic structure
and toward a model based on individual accounts. Beyond the distribu-
tive injustices this shift is likely to cause, a move to individual accounts
will no doubt place a huge burden on individuals in terms of their ability
to wisely handle investment decisions and interactions with investment
professionals. If this nation is to experience an unprecedented transfer
of government-managed retirement assets into private hands, it would
be wise to allow the courts to confront the power disparities that exist
between investors and their advisors.
The Social Security Trust Fund currently contains $1.4 trillion in
assets.286 To prevent financial services professionals from taking more
285. See Fanto, supra note 178. The worker to retiree ratio has fallen from 16 to 1 in
1950 to its current level of 3.3 to 1. By 2040, the ratio will be 2 to 1, a level insufficient
to fulfill current promises while maintaining current taxation levels. See Social Security
Administration, Frequently Asked Questions About Social Security's Future, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/qa.htm.
286. Social Security Administration, at http'//www.ssa.gov/qa.htm.
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than their fair share of this fortune in the coming decades, the legal
system must be able to respond energetically to aggressive sales
practices like the ones detailed in this Article. The annuities litigation
provided an opportunity for reform. Unfortunately because Congress
was in such a hurry to enact a different kind of reform, the judicial
process was incapacitated. One hopes that Congress can learn a lesson
from this episode and perhaps loosen the strictures it has imposed on a
litigation system that, for all its warts, is an important mechanism for
checking the excesses of the market.
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